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Estimations of the size and development of the shadow economy for 145 countries, including 
developing, transition and highly developed OECD economies over the period 1999 to 2003 
are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (as a percent of “official” GDP) in 
2002/03 in 96 developing countries is 38.7%, in 25 transition countries 40.1%, in 21 OECD 
countries 16.3% and in 3 Communist countries 22.3%. An increased burden of taxation and 
social security contributions, combined with labor market regulation, are the driving forces of 
the shadow economy. Furthermore, the results show that the shadow economy reduces 
corruption in high-income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. 
Finally, the various estimation methods are discussed and critically evaluated. 
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1 Introduction 
 
As corruption and shadow economic activities are a fact of life around the world, most 
societies attempt to control these activities through various measures like punishment, 
prosecution, economic growth or education. To gather information about the extend of 
corruption and the shadow economy and it’s relationship or who is engaged in corrupt and/or 
underground activities, the frequencies with which these activities are occurring and the 
magnitude of them, is crucial for making effective and efficient decisions regarding the 
allocations of a country’s resources in this area. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to get 
accurate information about the relationship between corruption and shadow economy 
activities on the goods and labor market, because all individuals engaged in these activities 
wish not to be identified. Hence, doing research in these two areas can be considered as a 
scientific passion for knowing the unknown.  
 
Although quite a large literature
1) on single aspects of the hidden or shadow economy exists 
and a comprehensive survey has been written by Schneider (the author of this paper) and 
Enste (2000), the subject is still quite controversial
2) as there are disagreements about the 
definition of shadow economy activities, the estimation procedures and the use of their 
estimates in economic analysis and policy aspects.
3) Nevertheless around the world, there are 
some indications for an increase of the shadow economy but little is known about the 
development and the size of the shadow economies in transition, development and developed 
countries over the latest period 1999/2000 to 2002/2003.  
 
Hence, the goal of this paper is threefold: to undertake the challenging task to estimate the 
shadow economy for 145 countries all over the world to provide some insights about the main 
causes of the shadow economy and to explore the relationship between shadow and 
corruption. In section 2 an attempt is made to define the shadow economy and some 
                                                           
1) The literature about the „shadow“, „underground“, „informal“, „second“, “cash-“ or „parallel“, economy is 
increasing. Various topics, on how to measure it, its causes, its effect on the official economy are analyzed. See 
for example, survey type publications by Frey and Pommerehne (1984); Thomas (1992); Loayza (1996); Pozo 
(1996); Lippert and Walker (1997); Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 1997, 1998a); Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 
(1997), Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a, 1998b); Belev (2003); Gerxhani (2003) and Pedersen 
(2003). For an overall survey of the global evidence of the size of the shadow economy see Schneider and Enste 
(2000, 2002), Schneider (2003, 2005) and Alm, Martinez and Schneider (2004), and Kazemier (20025a) 
2) Compare e.g. in the Economic Journal, vol. 109, no. 456, June 1999 the feature “controversy: on the hidden 
economy”. 
3) Compare the different opinions of Tanzi (1999), Thomas (1999), Giles (1999a,b) and Pedersen (2003), and 
Janisch and Brümmerhoff (2005). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  4 
theoretical considerations about the reasons why the shadow is increasing are undertaken. 
Section 3 presents the econometric estimation results and the calculation of the size of the 
shadow economy over 145 countries over the period 1999/2000 to 2002/03. In section 4 two 
hypotheses about the relationship between the shadow and corruption are derived and some 
empirical results are shown. Finally, in section 5 a summary is given and some policy 
conclusions are drawn. Finally in the three appendices (chapter 6, 7 and 8) the various 
methods to estimate the shadow economy are presented and critically evaluated, as well as a 
definition of the variables and data sources are given and the descriptive statistics of the 
variables are shown. 
 
2  Some Theoretical Considerations about the Shadow Economy 
2.1  Defining the Shadow Economy
4) 
 
Most authors trying to measure the shadow economy face the difficulty of how to define it. 
One commonly used working definition is all currently unregistered economic activities that 
contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product.
5) Smith (1994, p. 
18) defines it as „market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal that 
escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP.“ Or to put it in another way, one of the 
broadest definitions of it, includes…”those economic activities and the income derived from 
them that circumvent or other wise government regulation, taxation or observation”.
6) As 
these definitions still leave open a lot of questions, table 2.1 is helpful for developing a better 
feeling for what could be a reasonable consensus definition of the underground (or shadow) 
economy. 
 
From table 2.1, it becomes clear that a broad definition of the shadow economy includes 
unreported income from the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or 
                                                           
4) This paper focuses on the size and development of the shadow economy for countries and does not show any 
disaggregated values for specific regions. Lately some first studies were undertaken to measure the size of the 
shadow economy as well as the “grey” or “shadow” labor force for urban regions or states (e.g. California). 
Compare e.g. Marcelli, Pastor and Joassart (1999), Marcelli (2004), Chen (2004), Williams (2004a, b, 2005a, b, 
2006), Williams and Windebank (1999, 2001a, b), Flaming, Haydamack, and Jossart (2005) and Alderslade, 
Talmage and Freeman (2006), and Brueck, Haisten-DeNew and Zimmermann (2006). 
5) This definition is used for example, by Feige (1989, 1994), Schneider (1994a, 2003, 2005) and Frey and 
Pommerehne (1984). Do-it-yourself activities are not included. For estimates of the shadow economy and the do-
it-yourself activities for Germany see Karmann (1986, 1990). 
6) This definition is taken from Del’Anno (2003), Del’Anno and Schneider (2004) and Feige (1989); see also 
Thomas (1999), Fleming, Roman and Farrell (2000). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  5 
barter transactions – and so includes all economic activities that would generally be taxable 
were they reported to the state (tax) authorities. In this paper the following more narrow 
definition of the shadow economy is used:
7) The shadow economy includes all market-based 
legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities 
for the following reasons:  
 
(1) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, 
(2) to avoid payment of social security contributions, 
(3) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and 
(4) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
 
Hence, in this paper, I will not deal with typical underground, economic (classical crime) 
activities, which are all illegal actions that fits the characteristics of classical crimes like 
burglary, robbery, drug dealing, etc. I also include not the informal household economy 
which consists of all household services and production. Also this paper does not focus on 
tax evasion or tax compliance, because it would get to long, and moreover tax evasion is a 
different subject, where already a lot of research has been underway.
8) 
 
                                                           
7) Compare also the excellent discussion of the definition of the shadow economy in Pedersen (2003, pp.13-19) 
and Kazemier (2005a) who use a similar one. 
8) Compare, e.g. the survey of Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) and the paper by Kirchler, Maciejovsky and 
Schneider (2002). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  6 
Table 2.1: A Taxonomy of Types of Underground Economic Activities
1) 





Trade with stolen goods; drug dealing 
and manufacturing; prostitution; 
gambling; smuggling; fraud; etc.  
 
Barter of drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling etc. Produce or growing 



















salaries and assets 
from unreported work 
related to legal 










1) Structure of the table is taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) with additional remarks. 
 
2.2  The Main Causes of Determining the Shadow Economy 
2.2.1  Tax and Social Security Contribution Burdens 
In almost all studies
9) it has been found out, that the tax and social security contribution 
burdens are one of the main causes for the existence of the shadow economy. Since taxes 
affect labor-leisure choices, and also stimulate labor supply in the shadow economy, the 
distortion of the overall tax burden is a major concern of economists. The bigger the 
difference between the total cost of labor in the official economy and the after-tax earnings 
(from work), the greater is the incentive to avoid this difference and to work in the shadow 
economy. Since this difference depends broadly on the social security burden/payments and 
the overall tax burden, they are key features of the existence and the increase of the shadow 
economy.  
But even major tax reforms with major tax rate deductions will not lead to a substantial 
decrease of the shadow economy.
10) Such reforms will only be able to stabilize the size of the 
shadow economy and avoid a further increase. Social networks and personal relationships, the 
high profit from irregular activities and associated investments in real and human capital are 
strong ties which prevent people from transferring to the official economy. For Canada, Spiro 
                                                           
9) See Thomas (1992); Lippert and Walker (1997); Schneider (1994a,b, 1997, 1998a,b, 2000, 2003b, 2005); 
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a,1998b); Tanzi (1999); Giles (1999a); Mummert and Schneider 
(2001); Giles and Tedds (2002) and Dell’Anno (2003), just to quote a few recent ones. 
10) See Schneider (1994b, 1998b) for a similar result of the effects of a major tax reform in Austria on the 
shadow economy. Schneider shows that a major reduction in the direct tax burden did not lead to a major 
reduction in the shadow economy. Because legal tax avoidance was abolished and other factors, like regulations, 
were not changed; hence for a considerable part of the tax payers the actual tax and regulation burden remained 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  7 
(1993) found similar reactions of people facing an increase in indirect taxes (VAT, GST). 
This fact makes it even more difficult for politicians to carry out major reforms because they 
may not gain a lot from them. 
Empirical results of the influence of the tax burden on the shadow economy is provided in the 
studies of Schneider (1994b, 2000, 2004, 2005) and Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón 
(1998a, 1998b); they all found statistically significant evidence for the influence of taxation 
on the shadow economy. This strong influence of indirect and direct taxation on the shadow 
economy is further demonstrated by discussing empirical results in the case of Austria and the 
Scandinavian countries. For Austria the driving force for the shadow economy activities is the 
direct tax burden (including social security payments), it has the biggest influence, followed 
by the intensity of regulation and complexity of the tax system. A similar result has been 
achieved by Schneider (1986) for the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden). In all three countries various tax variables (average direct tax rate, average total tax 
rate (indirect and direct tax rate)) and marginal tax rates have the expected positive sign (on 
currency demand) and are highly statistically significant. These findings are supported by 
studies of Kirchgaessner (1983, 1984) for Germany and by Klovland (1984) for Norway and 
Sweden, too. 
In this study an attempt will be made to investigate the influence of the direct and indirect tax 
burden as well as the social security payments on the shadow economy for developing, 
transition and highly developed countries. Hence, for the first time this influence is 
investigated for developing, transition and highly developed countries for the same time 
period and using the same estimation technique. 
 
2.2.2  Intensity of Regulations 
The increase of the intensity of regulations (often measured in the numbers of laws and 
regulations, like licenses requirements) is another important factor, which reduces the 
freedom (of choice) for individuals engaged in the official economy.
11) One can think of labor 
market regulations, trade barriers, and labor restrictions for foreigners. Johnson, Kaufmann, 
and Zoido-Lobatón (1998b) find an overall significant empirical evidence of the influence of 
(labor) regulations on the shadow economy, the impact is clearly described and theoretically 
derived in other studies, e.g. for Germany (Deregulation Commission 1990/91). Regulations 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
unchanged. 
11)See for a (social) psychological, theoretical foundation of this feature, Brehm (1966, 1972), and for a (first) 
application to the shadow economy, Pelzmann (1988). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  8 
lead to a substantial increase in labor costs in the official economy. But since most of these 
costs can be shifted on the employees, these costs provide another incentive to work in the 
shadow economy, where they can be avoided. Empirical evidence supporting the model of 
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), which predicts, inter alia, that countries with more 
general regulation of their economies tend to have a higher share of the unofficial economy in 
total GDP, is found in their empirical analysis. A one-point increase of the regulation index 
(ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 = the most regulation in a country), ceteris paribus, is associated 
with an 8.1 percentage point increase in the share of the shadow economy, when controlled 
for GDP per capita (Johnson et. al. (1998b), p. 18). They conclude that it is the enforcement 
of regulation, which is the key factor for the burden levied on firms and individuals, and not 
the overall extent of regulation - mostly not enforced - which drive firms into the shadow 
economy. Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) reach a similar result. In 
their study every available measure of regulation is significantly correlated with the share of 
the unofficial economy and the sign of the relationship is unambiguous: more regulation is 
correlated with a larger shadow economy. A one point increase in an index of regulation 
(ranging from 1-5) is associated with a 10 % increase in the shadow economy for 76 
developing, transition and developed countries. 
These findings demonstrate that governments should put more emphasis on improving 
enforcement of laws and regulations, rather than increasing their number. Some governments, 
however, prefer this policy option (more regulations and laws), when trying to reduce the 
shadow economy, mostly because it leads to an increase in power of the bureaucrats and to a 
higher rate of employment in the public sector. In this study the effect of government 
regulation on the development of the shadow economy will be investigated for developing, 
transition and highly developed countries. 
 
2.2.3  Public Sector Services 
An increase of the shadow economy can lead to reduced state revenues which in turn reduce 
the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. Ultimately, this can lead to 
an increase in the tax rates for firms and individuals in the official sector, quite often 
combined with a deterioration in the quality of the public goods (such as the public 
infrastructure) and of the administration, with the consequence of even stronger incentives to 
participate in the shadow economy. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a,b) 
present a simple model of this relationship. Their findings show that smaller shadow 
economies appear in countries with higher tax revenues, if achieved by lower tax rates, fewer 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  9 
laws and regulations and less bribery facing enterprises. Countries with a better rule of the 
law, which is financed by tax revenues, also have smaller shadow economies. Transition 
countries have higher levels of regulation leading to a significantly higher incidence of 
bribery, higher effective taxes on official activities and a large discretionary framework of 
regulations and consequently to a higher shadow economy. Their overall conclusion is that 
“wealthier countries of the OECD, as well as some in Eastern Europe find themselves in the 
‘good equilibrium’ of relatively low tax and regulatory burden, sizeable revenue mobilization, 
good rule of law and corruption control, and [relatively] small unofficial economy. By 
contrast, a number of countries in Latin American and the Former Soviet Union exhibit 
characteristics consistent with a ‘bad equilibrium’: tax and regulatory discretion and burden 
on the firm is high, the rule of law is weak, and there is a high incidence of bribery and a 
relatively high share of activities in the unofficial economy.“ (Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-
Lobatón 1998a p. I). First results of corruption on the shadow economy and vice versa are 
reported in chapter 4.  
 
2.2.4  Public Opinion about the Shadow Economy 
The perception of citizen/voters about the shadow economy and their (moral) reaction to this 
phenomenon is also an important factor, under which circumstances people decide to work in 
the shadow economy. There are a number of empirical studies, which investigate the tax 
moral of people and their attitudes against the shadow economy 
12. In this short section some 
results for Germany are shown which clearly demonstrate that people have no bad (moral) 
feeling when working in the shadow economy. In table 2.2 for the year 2003 it is investigated, 
whether people regularly work in the shadow economy or not. 25 % of the German 
respondents say “yes”, and 46 % of the respondents regularly demand shadow economy 
activities. In table 2.3 some reasons are asked, why shadow economy activities are demanded. 
The most important result is, one saves money – or shadow economy activities are much 
cheaper than the official ones. The second most important reason is, that the tax and social 
security burden is too high ( 73 % of the respondents) and reason number 3 is, that due to the 
much higher labour costs in the official economy, one would not demand this activities. 
Especially the third answer is interesting, because this result clearly demonstrates that only 23 
% of the demanded shadow economy activities have substitutive character (i.e. they would 
demanded in the official economy if there would be no shadow economy) and only 9 % of the 
                                                           
12Compare Halla and Schneider (2005), Torgler (2002), Torgler and Schneider (2005), Feld and Frey (2005), 
and Feld and Larsen (2005). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  10 
respondents answer, they would do by themselves. From this survey result one can conclude 
that roughly 70% of these activities would not be taken place if there would be no shadow 
economy. In table 2.4 examples of some hourly wage rates of shadow economy activities in 
Germany are shown and what is here surprising, is the huge range of wage rates in the shadow 
economy, for example varying for an hours work of a painter between € 9 an € 17. Table 2.4 
clearly demonstrates also the large difference (a multiplicative factor between 4 and 5) 
between the wage rates in the shadow economy and in the official one.  
In table 2.5 important attitudes of the German population are shown, concentrating on the 
issue, what are “Kavaliersdelikte”. These results convingly demonstrate over the years 1996 
to 2003 that roughly two thirds of the German population treat shadow economy activities as 
a “Kavalierdelikt”, where is “Stealing a newspaper from a box”, only a third treats such a 
small theft as a “Kavaliersdelikt”. In table 2.6 values statements of the German population 
with respect to the shadow economy are shown, again two thirds say that without shadow 
economy earnings one can not keep the achieved standard of living and only a third of the 
asked population means that shadow economy activities lead to great losses of tax revenues 
and social security payments to the state. What is most amazing in table 2.6, are the attitudes 
of the German population with respect to punishment of shadow economy activities: only 
between 9 % and 3 % of the asked German population are convinced, that shadow economy 
workers should be reported to the authorities and prosecuted! A similar extreme low figure 
one gets, when asking if a shadow economy worker is detected, he should severely be 
punished. Only between 7% and 3% of the asked population say, “yes” this clearly shows that 
there is no bad (moral) feeling about working in the shadow economy among the German 
population. The results are quite similar for Austria. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  11 
 
Table 2.2: Work in the Shadow Economy – Survey Results for 2003 
(1) Do you work regularly in the 
shadow economy? (in order to earn 
300 Euro and more per month) 









(2) Do you demand regularly 
shadow economy activities? 





Representative Questionnaire, Germany, May 2003,  
Source: Schneider (2004) 
 
 
Table 2.3: Reasons, for Shadow Economy Activities – Survey Results for Germany, May 
2003 
Reasons, why shadow economy activities are demanded  Values  in 
percent 
(1) One saves money – or they are much cheaper than in the official one 
(2) The tax and social security burden is much too high 
(3) Due to the high labour costs in the official economy one would not demand 
these activities (extreme assumption no shadow economy: 23% demand these 
activities in the official economy, 9% make do-it-yourself) 
(4) The firms offer them from themselves 








Representative questionnaire, Germany, May 2003, Source: Schneider(2004) 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  12 
 
Table 2.4: Hourly wage rates of shadow economy activities – Survey Results for 
Germany, 2004 
Activity/Type of Worker  Town/Area  Wage rate in the 
shadow economy (in 
€) 
Wage rate in the 





10 – 17 
9 – 15 






13 – 23 
15 – 19 
15 – 23 
 
58 






300 – 380 
400 – 450 
350 – 420 
 
1.800 
Representative questionnaire, May 2003, Source: Schneider (2004) 
 
 
Table 2.5: Values/Attitudes of the German population regarding shadow economy 
Question: What are „Kavaliersdelikte“ (neglegible delicts)? 












To demand activities in the 
shadow economy  55 64  60  68  67 
To drive too quick with a car  42 43  44  45  46 
To undertake oneself shadow 
economy activities  36 41  33  36  38 
Stealing a newspaper from a box  28 29  31  30  28 
Not to send children to school  25 27  24  18  16 
Not to be honest with the tax 
declaration  22 22  18  -  18 
Not to go to work (make „blue“ 
on a Monday)  18 17  16  13  12 
To drive drunken  9 4  7  3  4 
Source: Schneider (2004) 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  13 
Table 2.6: Values/Attitudes of the German population regarding shadow economy 
Statements  











Without shadow economy earnings one cannot 
keep up the standard of living 
62 69 69  70  71 
It‘s the state/government own fault that the 
shadow economy is so popular and large, because 
the tax and social security burden is too high 
63 67 57  66  67 
In the last 2-3 years I have demanded shadow 
economy activities 
26 38 34  36  39 
Due to shadow economy activities the state 
looses a great amount of tax revenues and social 
security payments 
29 25 30  28  26 
In the neighbourhood one observes a lot of 
shadow economy activities 
- -  24  28  32 
I think, shadow economy workers should be 
reported to the authorities and prosecuted 
9 4 6  3  3 
If a shadow economy worker is detected he 
should be punished severely (high financial fines) 
7 4 5  7  3 
Source: Schneider (2004) 
 
2.2.5  Summary of the Main Causes of the Shadow Economy 
In table 2.7 an overview of a number of empirical studies is given which summarizes the 
empirical results of the various factors influencing the shadow economy. In table 2.7 we have 
to two columns, showing the various factors influencing the shadow economy with and 
without the independent variable, “tax moral”. This table clearly demonstrates that the 
increase of the tax and social security contribution burdens is by far most important single 
influence of the increase of the shadow economy. This factor does “explain” between 35 - 
38% or 45 - 52% of the variance of the shadow economy with and without including the 
variable “tax moral”, then follows the variable tax moral which “explains” between 22 – 25% 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  14 
of the variance of the shadow economy 
13and finally follows a third factor, “intensity of state 
regulation “(mostly for the labour market). In general table 2.7 shows, that the independent 
variables tax and social security burden followed by variables tax moral and by intensity of 
state regulations are the three major driving forces of the shadow economy. 
 
Table 2.7: Main Causes of the Increase of the Shadow Economy 
Factors Influencing the Shadow Economy 
The most important driving forces are:  Influence on the shadow economy (in%) 1) 
(1) Increase of the Tax and Social Security 
Contribution Burdens 
35-38% 45-52% 
(2) Intensity of State Regulations   8-10%  10-15% 
(3) Social Transfers  5-7%  5-8% 
(4) Specific Labor Market Regulations 5-7%  5-8% 
(5) Public Sector Services  5-7%  5-8% 
(6) Tax Morale 2)  22-25%  - 
Overall influence  76-94%  70-90% 
1) Average values of empirical results of 28 studies. 
2) Average values of „only“ 15 studies 
Source: Schneider (2004) 
 
3  The Size of the Shadow Economies for 145 Countries 
3.1 Econometric  Results 
 
In tables 3.1 to 3.3 the econometric estimations using the DYMIMIC approach (latent 
estimation approach) are presented for the 96 developing countries, the 28 (25) transition and 
3 communist countries and the 21 industrialized (highly developed) OECD-countries.
14) This 
grouping was necessary because the available data situation is different for these countries. 
For the 96 developing countries and the 28 transition and communist countries the estimation 
                                                           
13 The innocence of this variable with respect to theory and empirical importance is also shown in Feld and Frey 
(2002, 2002a and 2005), Frey (1997), and Torgler and Schneider (2005) 
14) The classification which country is a developing country follows the one done by the World Bank (2002) 
using a benchmark a per capita income of 9,265 USD or less. The others with a higher income are either 
transition or industrialized countries (here 21 OECD countries). The grouping of the transition countries is done 
following the grouping in of the OECD country studies (Paris, various years). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  15 
was done for three different points of time 1999/2000, 2001/02 and 2002/03 and for the 21 
OECD countries I have six data points of time 1990/91, 1994/95, 1997/98, 1999/2000, 
2001/02 and 2002/03. For the developing and transition countries I use as cause variables the 
following ones: share of direct and indirect taxation (in % of GDP) as the two tax burden 
variables; burden of state regulation (Index of regulation, Heritage Foundation, 2005), 
unemployment quota and GDP per capita as two cause variables for the status of the “official” 
economy. As indicator variables I use the employment quota (in % of the population between 
18 and 64), annual rate of GDP, and annual rate of local currency per capita.
15) For the OECD 
countries I use as additional cause variables the burden of social security payments, the tax 
morale, quality of state institutions and an index of the regulation of the labor market. 
The estimation results for the 96 developing countries in Middle and South America, Africa, 
Asia and South West Pacific Islands are shown in table 3.1. All estimated coefficients of the 
independent cause variables are statistically significant and have the theoretically expected 
signs. If one first considers the two tax burden variables one realizes, that the share of direct 
taxation is just statistically significant (90% confidence level) and the size of the estimated 
coefficient has half the size of the value of the share of indirect taxation and custom duties 
which is highly statistically significant and the estimated coefficient has a much larger size. 
One can interpret this result, that direct taxation is a less important for the development of the 
shadow economy in developing countries, compared to indirect taxation and custom duties. If 
one turns to the burden of state regulation, the Heritage Foundation index, this variable is 
highly statistically significant, like the two variables, measuring the official economy, 
unemployment quota and GDP per capita. As a single independent variable, the burden of 
state regulation, has the quantitative largest impact on the size of the shadow economy, 
showing that state regulation is the most important factor for the size of the shadow economy 
in developing countries. But also the official labor market is quite important, the 
unemployment quota has the second largest estimated coefficient and influence on the shadow 
economy in the 96 developing countries in Middle and South America, Africa, Asia and 
South West Pacific Islands. If we turn to the indicator variables, we see, that the employment 
quota as well as the change of local currency per capita have the expected negative and 
positive influence and are highly statistically significant.
16)  
                                                           
15) Here I have the problem, that in some developing and transition countries the US-$ (or Euro) is also a widely 
used currency, which is not considered here, because I got no reliable figures of the amount of US-$ (Euro) in 
these developing and transition countries. 
16) The estimation results are in general robust, if other indicator variables are used as residuum; e.g. if the 
variable currency per capita is used as residuum the share of direct taxation becomes insignificant as well as the 
variable GPD per capita. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  16 
In table 3.2 the estimation results are presented for the 25 transition countries in Central and 
East Europe and of former Soviet Union Countries and 3 communist countries 
17. Again all 
estimated coefficients of the cause variables are statistically significant and similar as in the 
case of the developing countries the two tax burden variables have together the quantitative 
largest impact on the size of the shadow economy. Opposite to the results of the 96 
developing countries, the cause variable, “share of direct taxation” (including social security 
payments) has a highly statistically significant influence with the expected positive sign on 
the shadow economy. Also the independent variable “share of indirect taxation” has a highly 
statistically significant influence, but the estimated coefficient is somewhat smaller then 
compared to the one the share of direct taxation (including social security payments). The 
variable, “unemployment quota” has also the expected positive influence and is highly 
statistically significant and has the second largest estimated coefficient. The indicator 
variables, “employment quota”, and, “the annual rate of currency per capita” have the 
theoretically expected signs and are statistically highly significant. 
 
Finally, in table 3.3 the results for 21 highly developed OECD countries are shown. For these 
countries the availability of data is somewhat better: Not only have I more data points over 
time but also I have three additional cause variables, tax morale (an index), quality of state 
institutions and now, as separate variable, the burden of social security payments (in % of 
GDP). The additional indicator variable is the average working time (per week).
18) The 
estimated coefficients of all eight cause variables are statistically significant and have the 
theoretically expected signs. The tax and social security burden variables are quantitatively 
the most important ones followed by the tax moral variable which has the single biggest 
influence; hence the tax payers attitude against the state institutions/government is quite 
important to determine whether one is engaged in shadow economy activities or not. Also the 
development of the official economy measured in unemployment and GDP per capita has a 
quantitative important influence on the shadow economy. Turning to the four indicator 
variables they all have a statistically significant influence and the estimated coefficients have 
the theoretically expected signs. The quantitatively most important independent variables are 
the employment quota and change of currency per capita.
19)  
                                                           
17 How useful it is to conclude the three communist countries in this estimation, is an open and debatable 
question, as these countries have only a somewhat limited market system. Hence they may not fit in this sample, 
which may be a point of criticism. 
18) Using this indicator variable one has the problem that, of course, this variable is influenced by state 
regulation, so that this variable is not really exogenous; hence the estimation may be biased. 
19) The variable currency per capita or annual change of currency per capita is heavily influenced by banking 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  17 
 
Summarizing, the econometric results demonstrate that for all three groups of countries the 
theoretical considerations about the causes of the shadow economy in section 2 can be 
confirmed: The direct tax (and social security) payment and indirect tax burden variables are 
the driving forces of the growth of the shadow economy for all three types of countries 
(developing, transition and highly developed OECD countries), followed by the measure of 
state regulation and as measures of the official economy the unemployment quota and GDP 
per capita. In the developing country the largest influence has the burden of state regulation, 
followed by the unemployment quota and the share of indirect taxation. In the transition 
countries direct taxation (including social security payments) has the largest influence, 
followed by the unemployment quota and share of indirect taxation. In the highly developed 
OECD countries, the social security contributions and share of direct taxation has the biggest 
influence, followed by the tax morale and quality of state institutions. From these results we 
see that there are some differences, which influence the shadow economy according to these 
three different country groups.
20)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
innovations; hence this variable is pretty unstable in the estimations with respect to the length of the estimation 
period. Similar problems are already mentioned by Giles (1999a) and Giles and Tedds (2002). 
20) Due to space considerations it is not possible to make here an extensive discussion why we observe these 
differences. The author currently is doing an extensive research on these differences which will come out in a 
discussion paper this fall.  26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  18 
 
Table 3.1: DYMIMIC Estimations of the size of the shadow economy of 96 developing 
countries in Middle and South  America, Africa, Asia and South West Pacific Islands 
over 1999/00, 2001/02 and 2002/03 
 
Cause Variables  Estimated Coefficients 
Share of direct taxation  λ1 = 0.16
(*
) 
(in % of GDP)  (1.77) 
  
Share of indirect taxation  λ2 = 0.256** 
and custom duties (in % of GDP)  (3.34) 
  
Burden of state regulation (Index, Heritage 
Found., score 1 most economic freedom, 5 
least economic freedom) 
λ3 = 0.309** 
(2.84) 
  
Unemployment quota (%)  λ4 = 0.296** 
   (3.96) 
  
GDP per capita (in US-$)  λ5 = -0.151* 
   (-2.56) 




Indicator Variables   
Employment quota  λ7 = -0.651** 
(in % of population 18-64)  (-3.45) 
  
Annual rate of GDP   λ8 = -1 (Residuum) 
  
  
Change of local currency  λ9 = 0.412** 
per capita  (4.99) 
   RMSE
1) = 0.0004
(*
) (p-value = 0.952) 
Test-statistics  Chi-square
2) =  7.53 (p-value = 0.904) 
   TMNCV
3) = 0.042 
   AGFI
4) = 0.774 
   N = 288 
   D.F.
5) = 34 
Notes: 
t-statistics are given in parentheses (*); *; ** means the t-statistics is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, or 99% confidence level. 
1) Steigers Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) for test of close fit; RMSEA < 0.05; 
the RMSEA-value varies between 0.0 and 1.0. 
2) If the structural equation model is asymptotically correct, then the matrix S (sample covariance 
matrix) will be equal to Σ (θ) (model implied covariance matrix). This test has a statistical validity 
with a large sample (N ≥ 100) and multinomial distributions; both is given for a all three equations
in tables 3.1-3.3 using a test of multi normal distributions. 
3) Test of Multivariate Normality for Continuous Variables (TMNCV); p-values of skewness and 
kurtosis. 
4) Test of Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), varying between 0 and 1; 1 = perfect fit. 
5) The degrees of freedom are determined by 0.5 (p + q) (p + q + 1) – t; with p = number of 
indicators; q = number of causes; t = the number for free parameters. 
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Table 3.2: DYMIMIC Estimation of the Shadow Economy of 25 Central and East 
European and Former Soviet Union Countries and 3 Communist Countries, Years 
1999/00, 2001/02 and 2002/03 
 
Cause Variables  Estimated Coefficients 
Share of direct taxation  λ1 = 0.461** 
+ share of social security payments  (3.71) 
(in % of GDP)   
  
Share of indirect taxation  λ2 = 0.361** 
+ custom duties (in % of GDP)  (3.31) 
  
Burden of state regulation (Index, Heritage 
Found., score 1 most economic freedom, 5 
least economic freedom) 
λ3 = 0.192* 
(2.48) 
  
Unemployment quota (%)  λ4 = 0.391** 
   (3.91) 
  
GDP per capita (in US-$)  λ5 = -0.221** 
   (-3.77) 
Lagged endogenous variable  λ6 = 0.284*
 
(2.06) 
Indicator Variables   
Employment quota  λ7 = -0.729** 
(as % of population 18-64)  (-5.49) 
  
Annual rate of GDP  λ8 = -1.00 (Residuum) 
  
  
Change of local currency  λ9 = 0.432** 
per capita  (3.88) 
   RMSE
1) = 0.0003
(*
) (p-value = 0.914) 
   Chi-square 
2) = 403.41 (p-value = 0.762) 
Test-statistics  TMCV
3) = 0.091 
   AGFI
4) = 0.661 
   N = 84 
   D.F.
5) = 33 
Notes: 
t-statistics are given in parentheses (*); *; ** means the t-statistics is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, or 99% confidence level. 
1) Steigers Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) for test of close fit; RMSEA < 0.05; 
the RMSEA-value varies between 0.0 and 1.0. 
2) If the structural equation model is asymptotically correct, then the matrix S (sample covariance 
matrix) will be equal to Σ (θ) (model implied covariance matrix). This test has a statistical validity 
with a large sample (N ≥ 100) and multinomial distributions; both is given for a all three equations 
in tables 3.1.1-3.1.3 using a test of multi normal distributions. 
3) Test of Multivariate Normality for Continuous Variables (TMNCV); p-values of skewness and 
kurtosis. 
4) Test of Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), varying between 0 and 1; 1 = perfect fit. 
5) The degrees of freedom are determined by 0.5 (p + q) (p + q + 1) – t; with p = number of 
indicators; q = number of causes; t = the number for free parameters. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  20 
Table 3.3: DYMIMIC Estimation of the Shadow Economy of 21 highly developed 
OECD Countries, years 1990/91, 1994/95, 1997/98, 1999/2000, 2001/02 and 2002/03 
 
Cause Variables  Estimated Coefficients 
Share of direct taxation  λ1 = 0.410* 
(in % of GDP)  (3.41) 
  
Share of indirect taxation  λ2 = 0.213(*) 
(in % of GDP)  (1.92) 
  
Share of social security contribution  λ3 = 0.523** 
(in % of GDP)  (4.59) 
  
Burden of state regulation (index of labour 
market regulation, Heritage Found., score 1 
least reg., score 5 most reg.) 
λ4 = 0.203(*) 
(1.84) 
  
Quality of state institutions (rule of law, 
World Bank, score -3 worst and +3 best 
case) 
λ5 = -0.346** 
(-2.76) 
  
Tax morale (WUS and EUS, Index, Scale tax 
cheating always justified =1, never justified 
=10) 
λ6 = -0.614** 
(-4.06) 
  
Unemployment quota (%)  λ7 = 0.399** 
   (3.41) 
  
GDP per capita (in US-$)  λ8 = -0.134** 
(-3.64) 






Indicator Variables  Estimated Coefficients 
Employment quota  λ10= -0.713** 
(in % of population 18-64)  (-3.49) 
  
Average working time (per week)  λ11 = -1.00 (Residuum) 
  
Annual rate of GDP (adjusted for the mean  λ12 = -0.345** 
of all 22 OECD countries)  (-3.513) 
  
Change of local currency  λ13 = 0.384** 
per capita  (4.71) 
   RMSE
1) = 0.0002* (p-value = 0.981) 
   Chi-square
2) = 6.54 (p-value = 0.921) 
Test-statistics  TMCV
3) = 0.038 
   AGFI
4) = 0.814 
   N = 126 
   D.F.
5) = 61 
Notes: 
t-statistics are given in parentheses (*); *; ** means the t-statistics is statistically significant at the 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  21 
90%, 95%, or 99% confidence level. 
1) Steigers Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) for test of close fit; RMSEA < 0.05; 
the RMSEA-value varies between 0.0 and 1.0. 
2) If the structural equation model is asymptotically correct, then the matrix S (sample covariance 
matrix) will be equal to Σ (θ) (model implied covariance matrix). This test has a statistical validity 
with a large sample (N ≥ 100) and multinomial distributions; both is given for a all three equations 
in tables 3.1.1-3.1.3 using a test of multi normal distributions. 
3) Test of Multivariate Normality for Continuous Variables (TMNCV); p-values of skewness and 
kurtosis. 
4) Test of Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), varying between 0 and 1; 1 = perfect fit. 
5) The degrees of freedom are determined by 0.5 (p + q) (p + q + 1) – t; with p = number of 
indicators; q = number of causes; t = the number for free parameters. 
 
 
In order to calculate the size and development of the shadow economies of 145 countries, I 
have to overcome the disadvantage of the DYMIMIC approach, which is; that one gets only 
relative estimated sizes of the shadow economy and one has to use another approach to get 
absolute figures. In order to calculate absolute figures of the size of the shadow economies 
from these DYMIMIC estimation results I use the already available estimations from the 
currency demand approach for Australia, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, India, Peru, 
Russia and the United States (from studies of Chatterjee, Chaudhury and Schneider (2006), 
Del’Anno and Schneider (2004), Bajada and Schneider (2003, 2005), Alexeev and Pyle 
(2003), Schneider and Enste (2002) and Lacko (2000)). As I have values of the shadow 
economy (in % of GDP) for various years for the above mentioned countries, I can use a 
benchmark procedure with the help of the currency demand estimation with figures to 




3.2  The Size of the Shadow Economies for 145 Countries for 1999/2000, 
2001/2002 and 2002/2003 
 
When showing the size of the shadow economies over the three periods of time (1999/2000, 
2001/2002 and 2002/2003) for the 145 countries which are quite different in location and 
developing stage, one should be aware that such country comparison give only a rough picture 
of the ranking of the size of the shadow economy over the countries and over time, because 
the DYMIMIC and the currency demand methods have shortcomings which are discussed in 
                                                           
21) This procedure is described in great detail in the paper Del’Anno and Schneider (2005). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  22 
appendix (chapter 5)
22). Due to these shortcomings a detailed discussion of the (relative) 
ranking of the size of the shadow economies is not done. 
 
3.2.1  Developing Countries 
23 
The results of the shadow economies for developing countries are divided by continent into 
Africa, Asia, and Central and South America, and are shown in Tables 3.2.1-3.2.3. The results 
for thirty-seven African countries are shown in Table 3.2.1. If we first consider the 
development of the shadow economies in these thirty-seven African countries from 1999-
2000, we realize that shadow economy in these African nations has increased. On average, the 
size of these thirty-seven African shadow economies was 41.3% of official GDP in 
1999/2000, and increased to 43.2% in 2002/2003. This is an average increase of 0.9 
percentage points over four years. Turning to the latest results for 2002/2003, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, and Nigeria (with 63.2, 60.2 and 59.4% respectively) have by far the largest 
shadow economies, and the country in the median position is Mozambique with 42.4%. South 
Africa has the lowest shadow economy, with 29.5%, followed by Lesotho with 33.3%, and 
Namibia with 33.4%.  
  The large  shadow economy in Africa (and in other developing countries) is only to 
some extend an issue of tax burdens than the simple fact that the limited local economy means 
that citizens are often unable to earn a living wage in a legitimate manner. Working in the 




Table 3.2.1: The Size of the Shadow Economy in Thirty-Seven African Countries 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using 
the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02  2002/03 
1 Algeria  34,1  35,0  35,6 
2 Angola  43,2  44,1  45,2 
3 Benin  47,3  48,2  49,1 
4 Botswana  33,4  33,9  34,6 
5 Burkina  Faso  41,4  42,6  43,3 
6 Burundi  36,9  37,6  38,7 
                                                           
22) See also Thomas (1992, 1999), Tanzi (1999), Pedersen (2003) and Ahumada, Alveredo, Cavanese A and P. 
Cavanese (2004), Janisch and Brümmerhoff (2005), Schneider (2005) and Breusch (2005a, 2005b). 
23) For an extensive and excellent literature survey of the research about the shadow economy in developing 
countries see Gerxhani (2003),who stresses thorough out her paper that the destination between developed and 
developing countries with respect to the shadow economy is of great importance. Due to space reasons this point 
is not further elaborated here also the former results and literature are not discussed here. Compare Schneider 
and Enste (2000) 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  23 
7 Cameroon  32,8  33,7  34,9 
8  Central African Republic  44,3  45,4  46,1 
9 Chad  46,2  47,1  48,0 
10  Congo, Dem. Rep.  48,0  48,8  49,7 
11 Congo,  Rep.  48,2  49,1  50,1 
12 Cote  d'Ivoire  43,2  44,3  45,2 
13  Egypt, Arab Rep.  35,1  36,0  36,9 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using 
the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02  2002/03 
14 Ethiopia  40,3  41,4  42,1 
15 Ghana  41,9  42,7  43,6 
16 Guinea  39,6  40,8  41,3 
17 Kenya  34,3  35,1  36,0 
18 Lesotho  31,3  32,4  33,3 
19 Madagascar  39,6  40,4  41,6 
20 Malawi  40,3  41,2  42,1 
21 Mali  42,3  43,9  44,7 
22 Mauritania  36,1  37,2  38,0 
23 Morocco  36,4  37,1  37,9 
24 Mozambique  40,3  41,3  42,4 
25 Namibia  31,4  32,6  33,4 
26 Niger  41,9  42,6  43,8 
27 Nigeria  57,9  58,6  59,4 
28 Rwanda  40,3  41,4  42,2 
29 Senegal  45,1  46,8  47,5 
30 Sierra  Leone  41,7  42,8  43,9 
31 South  Africa  28,4  29,1  29,5 
32 Tanzania  58,3  59,4  60,2 
33 Togo  35,1  39,2  40,4 
34 Tunisia  38,4  39,1  39,9 
35 Uganda  43,1  44,6  45,4 
36 Zambia  48,9  49,7  50,8 
37 Zimbabwe  59,4  61,0  63,2 
Unweighted Average  41,3  42,3  43,2 
 
In Table 3.2.2, the results for twenty-eight Asian countries are shown; it is somewhat difficult to treat 
all Asian countries equally because some, such as Israel, Singapore, and Hong Kong, are highly 
developed, while others such as Thailand and Nepal, are still developing. The average shadow 
economy in the region increased from 28.9% in 1999/2000, to 30.8% of official GDP in 2002/2003, 
which is an increase of 1.9 percentage points over four years. Looking at individual countries
24) for the 
year 2002/2003, with 54.1% Thailand has by far the largest shadow economy, followed by Cambodia 
with 52.4%, and Sri Lanka with 47.2% of official GDP. The median country is the Republic of Korean 
with 28.2% of official GDP, surrounded by Yemen with 29.1% and United Arab Emirates with 
27.8%. Singapore, Hong Kong, and Saudi Arabia have the lowest shadow economies with 
13.7%, 17.2%, and 19.7% of official GDP, respectively. 
                                                           
24) The case of India has been extensively investigated by Chatterjee, Chaudhury and Schneider (2006). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  24 
  It is clear that the average size of the Asian shadow economies is considerably smaller 
than the shadow economies of African and Latin American states––this is partly due to the 
fact that there are a greater number of developed countries, which have smaller shadow 
economies located in Asia. It should be noted, however, that average increase of the shadow 
economies in the region is slightly more rapid than in Africa. This is not surprising given that 
size of the average African shadow economy is already more then eleven percentage points 
higher than its Asian counterpart. There is simply more room for growth in Asia. 
 
Table 3.2.2: The Size of the Shadow Economy in Twenty-Eight Asian Countries 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using the 
DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02  2002/03 
1 Bangladesh  35,6  36,5  37,7 
2 Bhutan  29,4  30,5  31,7 
3 Cambodia  50,1  51,3  52,4 
4  Hong Kong, China  16,6  17,1  17,2 
5 India  23,1  24,2  25,6 
6 Indonesia  19,4  21,8  22,9 
7  Iran, Islamic Rep.  18,9  19,4  19,9 
8 Israel  21,9  22,8  23,9 
9 Jordan  19,4  20,5  21,6 
10 Korea,  Rep.  27,5  28,1  28,8 
11 Kuwait  20,1  20,7  21,6 
12 Lebanon  34,1  35,6  36,2 
13 Malaysia  31,1  31,6  32,2 
14 Mongolia  18,4  19,6  20,4 
15 Nepal  38,4  39,7  40,8 
16 Oman  18,9  19,4  19,8 
17 Pakistan  36,8  37,9  38,7 
18 Papua  New  Guinea  36,1  37,3  38,6 
19 Philippines  43,4  44,5  45,6 
20 Saudi  Arabia  18,4  19,1  19,7 
21 Singapore  13,1  13,4  13,7 
22 Sri  Lanka  44,6  45,9  47,2 
23 Syrian  Arab  Republic  19,3  20,4  21,6 
24 Taiwan,  China  25,4  26,6  27,7 
25 Thailand  52,6  53,4  54,1 
26 Turkey  32,1  33,2  34,3 
27 United  Arab  Emirates  26,4  27,1  27,8 
28 Yemen,  Rep.  27,4  28,4  29,1 
Unweighted Average  28,5  29,5  30,4 
 
In Table 3.2.3, the sizes of shadow for twenty-one Central and South American countries are shown. 
Averaging the figures in all twenty-one Central and South American countries, the shadow economy 
increased from 41.1% in the year 1999/2000 to 43.4% of official GDP in 2002/2003; an increase of 
2.3 percentage points over these four years. If I now turn to the size of the shadow economy for single 
countries for 2002/2003, Bolivia has the largest shadow economy with 68.3%, followed by Panama 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  25 
with 65.3%. and Peru with 60.9% of official GDP. The median country is Brazil with 42.3% and at the 
lower end are Chile with 20.9%, Costa Rica with 27.8%, and Argentina with 28.9% of official GDP.  
  The sizes of the shadow economies of African and Central and South American 
countries are generally similar. This is partly due to the factors mentioned earlier; for the 
majority of citizens in many of these countries, the only way to ensure a decent standard of 
living is to turn to the black market. As income inequality is much more pronounced in most 
Central and South American countries, compared to Africa, the rate of increase of in shadow 
economy activity in Central and South America is higher.  
 
Table 3.2.3: The Size of the Shadow Economy in Twenty-One Central and South American 
Countries 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using the 
DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02  2002/03 
1 Argentina  25,4  27,1  28,9 
2 Bolivia  67,1  68,1  68,3 
3 Brazil  39,8  40,9  42,3 
4 Chile  19,8  20,3  20,9 
5 Colombia  39,1  41,3  43,4 
6 Costa  Rica  26,2  27,0  27,8 
7 Dominican  Republic  32,1  33,4  34,1 
8 Ecuador  34,4  35,1  36,7 
9 El  Salvador  46,3  47,1  48,3 
10 Guatemala  51,5  51,9  52,4 
11 Haiti  55,4  57,1  58,6 
12 Honduras  49,6  50,8  51,6 
13 Jamaica  36,4  37,8  38,9 
14 Mexico  30,1  31,8  33,2 
15 Nicaragua  45,2  46,9  48,2 
16 Panama  64,1  65,1  65,3 
17 Paraguay  27,4  29,2  31,4 
18 Peru  59,9  60,3  60,9 
19 Puerto  Rico  28,4  29,4  30,7 
20 Uruguay  51,1  51,4  51,9 
21 Venezuela,  RB  33,6  35,1  36,7 
Unweighted Average  41,1  42,2  43,4 
 
3.2.2  Transition Countries 
The measurement of the size and development of the shadow economy in the transition countries 
has been undertaken since the late 80s starting with the work of Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), 
Johnson et.al. (1997) and Lacko (2000). They all are using the physical input (electricity) method 
(see Appendix 7.1.2.5) and come up with quite large figures. In the work of Alexeev and Pyle 
(2003) and Belev (2003) the above mentioned studies are critically evaluated arguing that the 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  26 
estimated sizes of the unofficial economies are to a large content a historical phenomenon and 
partly determined by institutional factors. 
 
In table 3.2.4 the size and development of the shadow economy of 25 East and Central European 
and Former Soviet Union countries are presented. Turning again first to the development of the 
size of the shadow economy over time, the average size of the shadow economy of these 25 East 
and Central European countries was 38.1% of official GDP in 1999/2000 and increased to 40.1% 
in 2002/2003 which is an increase of 2 percentage points over these four years. The highest 
shadow economies have Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Ukraine with 68.0%, 61.3% and 54.7%. The 
median country is Bulgaria, surrounded by Serbia and Montenegro of 39.1% and Romania of 
37.4%. At the lower end are the Czech Republic with 20.1%, the Slovak Republic with 20.2% and 
Hungary with 26.2% of official GDP. 
 
Table 3.2.4: The Size of the Shadow Economy in 25 East and Central European and 
Former Soviet Union Countries 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using the 
DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02 2002/03 
1 Albania  33,4 34,6 35,3 
2 Armenia  46,3 47,8 49,1 
3 Azerbaijan  60,6 61,1 61,3 
4 Belarus  48,1 49,3 50,4 
5  Bosnia and Herzegovina  34,1 35,4 36,7 
6 Bulgaria  36,9 37,1 38,3 
7 Croatia  33,4 34,2 35,4 
8 Czech  Republic  19,1 19,6 20,1 
9 Estonia  38,4 39,2 40,1 
10 Georgia  67,3 67,6 68,0 
11 Hungary  25,1 25,7 26,2 
12 Kazakhstan  43,2 44,1 45,2 
13 Kyrgyz  Republic  39,8 40,3 41,2 
14 Latvia  39,9 40,7 41,3 
15 Lithuania  30,3 31,4 32,6 
16 Macedonia,  FYR  34,1 35,1 36,3 
17 Moldova  45,1 47,3 49,4 
18 Poland  27,6 28,2 28,9 
19 Romania  34,4 36,1 37,4 
20 Russian  Federation  46,1 47,5 48,7 
21  Serbia and Montenegro  36,4 37,3 39,1 
22 Slovak  Republic  18,9 19,3 20,2 
23 Slovenia  27,1 28,3 29,4 
24 Ukraine  52,2 53,6 54,7 
25 Uzbekistan  34,1 35,7 37,2 
Unweighted Average  38,1 39,1 40,1 
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3.2.3  Highly developed OECD-Countries 
The size and development of 21 highly developed OECD countries is shown in table 3.2.5.  
 
Table 3.2.5: The Size of the Shadow Economy in 21 OECD Countries 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using the DYMIMIC 
and Currency Demand Method 
   Country  1999/00 2001/02  2002/03 
1 Australia  14,3  14,1 13,5 
2 Austria  9,8  10,6 10,9 
3 Belgium  22,2  22,0 21,0 
4 Canada  16,0  15,8 15,2 
5 Denmark  18,0  17,9 17,3 
6 Finland  18,1  18,0 17,4 
7 France  15,2  15,0 14,5 
8 Germany  16,0  16,3 16,8 
9 Greece  28,7  28,5 28,2 
10 Ireland  15,9  15,7 15,3 
11 Italy  27,1  27,0 25,7 
12 Japan  11,2  11,1 10,8 
13 Netherlands  13,1  13,0 12,6 
14 New  Zealand  12,8  12,6 12,3 
15 Norway  19,1  19,0 18,4 
16 Portugal  22,7  22,5 21,9 
17 Spain  22,7  22,5 22,0 
18 Sweden  19,2  19,1 18,3 
19 Switzerland  8,6  9,4 9,4 
20 United  Kingdom  12,7  12,5 12,2 
21 United  States  8,7  8,7 8,4 
Unweighted Average  16,8  16,7 16,3 
 
If we first consider again the development of the size and development of the shadow 
economies of these 21 OECD countries, we realize for the first time that the size of the 
shadow economy of these 21 OECD countries has decreased over the period 1999/2000 to 
2002/2003. The average size of the shadow economy in 1999/2000 of these 21 OECD 
countries was 16.8% of official GDP, it decreased to 16.3% in 2002/2003, a decrease of 0.5 
percentage points. If we consider single countries, Greece, Italy and Spain has by far the 
largest size of the shadow economy in 2002/2003 with 28.2%, 25.7% and 22.0% of official 
GDP. The median country is Ireland with 15.3%, surrounded by Germany with 16.8%
25) and 
Canada with 15.2% of official GDP. At the lower end are the United States, Switzerland and 
Japan with a shadow economy of 8.4%, 9.4% and 10.8% of official GDP. 
 
                                                           
25) Pickhardt and Sarda-Pous (2006) reach very similar values of the shadow economy for Germany using a 
combination of a MIMIC and Currency Demand Method. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  28 
3.2.4  South West Pacific Islands 
The size and development of the shadow economies of 10 South West Pacific islands is 
presented in table 3.2.6.  
 
Table 3.2.6.: The Size of the Shadow Economy in 10 South West Pacific Islands 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using the 
DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
   Country  1999/00 2001/02 2002/03 
1 Fiji  33,6 34,3 35,1 
2 Kiribati  34,1 35,0 35,3 
3 Maldives  30,3 31,4 32,0 
4 Marshall  Islands  28,1 29,0 29,6 
5  Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  31,3 32,1 33,2 
6 Palau  28,4 29,2 30,0 
7 Samoa  31,4 32,6 33,5 
8 Solomon  Islands  33,4 34,5 35,3 
9 Tonga  35,1 36,3 37,4 
10 Vanuatu  30,9 31,7 32,5 
Unweighted Average  31,7 32,6 33,4 
 
If we again consider first the development over time the average size of the shadow economy 
of these 10 South West Pacific islands countries, increased from 31.7% in the year 1999/2000 
to 33.4% in the year 2002/2003, which means an increase of 1.7 percentage points over these 
four years. The largest size of the shadow economy (the latest estimation period 2002/2003) 
has Tonga with 37.4%, followed by Solomon Islands with 35.3% and Kiribati with 35.3%. In 
the middle field is Micronesia and Samoa with a shadow economy of 33.2% and 33.5% of 
official GDP. The lowest shadow economy have the Marshall Islands and Palau with a 
shadow economy of 29.6% and 30.0%.  
 
3.2.5  Communist Countries 
In this last section the size and development of the shadow economy of 3 communist 
countries (China, Laos and Vietnam) is presented. The results are shown in table 3.2.7. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  29 
 
Table 3.2.7: The Size of the Shadow Economy in 3 Communist Countries 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using the DYMIMIC and 
Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02  2002/03 
1 China  13,1 14,4 15,6
2 Lao  PDR  30,6 31,9 33,4
3 Vietnam  15,6 16,9 17,9
Unweighted Average  19,8 21,1 22,3
 
If we again first consider the average development of the size of the shadow economy of these 
three Communist countries over time, the average size of the shadow economy in 1999/2000 
was 19.8% and increased to 22.3% in 2002/2003. This is an increase of 2.5 percentage points. 
Laos has the largest shadow economy with 33.4% and China the lowest with 15.6%. It should 
be aware that the shadow economy in these countries, and especially in China, which is partly 
a market economy and still a planning socialist economy, is difficult to interpret. It should be 
more seen as a parallel economy, where especially farmers produce additional products to 
earn some extra money. It is an open question whether the meaning of these shadow 
economies can be compared to the size of the other ones. That is one reason, why they are 
shown in this paper in an extra section.  
 




Theoretically, corruption and the shadow economy can be either complements or substitutes. 
Choi and Thum (2004) present a model where the option of entrepreneurs to go underground 
constrains a corrupt official’s ability to ask for bribes. Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston 
(2005a,b) extend the model to the explicit specification of institutional quality. The model 
shows that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in the sense that the existence of 
the shadow economy reduces the propensity of officials to demand grafts.  
 
Johnson et al. (1998), to the contrary, model corruption and the shadow economy as 
complements. In their full-employment model, labour can be either employed in the official 
sector or in the underground economy. Consequently, an increase in the shadow economy 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  30 
always decreases the size of the official market. In their model, corruption increases the 
shadow economy, as corruption can be viewed as one particular form of taxation and 
regulation (driving entrepreneurs underground). Hindriks et al. (1999) also show that the 
shadow economy is a complement to corruption. This is because, in this case, the tax payer 
colludes with the inspector so the inspector underreports the tax liability of the tax payer in 
exchange for a bribe.
27) 
 
Theoretically, the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy is thus unsettled. 
There is, however, reason to believe that the relationship might differ among high and low 
income countries. In high income countries, the official sector provides public goods like the 
rule of law, enforcement of contracts, and protection by an efficient police. Usually, only 
craftsmen or very small firms have (or take) the option of going underground. In this case, the 
shadow economy is hidden from tax inspectors and other officials. In other words, there are 
no bribes necessary or possible to buy the way out of the official sector. In high income 
countries – typically showing comparably small levels of corruption – individuals confronted 
with a corrupt official always have the choice to bring the official to court. Moreover, in high 
income countries corruption quite often takes place, for example, to bribe officials to get a 
(huge) contract from the public sector (e.g. in the construction sector). This contract is then 
handled in the official economy and not in the shadow economy. Hence, corruption in high 
income countries can be a means to achieve certain benefits which make work in the official 
economy easier, e.g., winning a contract from a public authority, getting a licence (e.g. for 
operating taxes or providing other services or getting the permission to convert land into 
“construction ready” land, etc.). In high income countries people thus bribe in order to be able 
engaging in more official economic activities. As Schneider and Enste (2000) point out, at 
least two thirds of the income earned in the shadow economy is immediately spent in the 
official sector. The shadow economy and the official sector might thus be complements. The 
corresponding increase in government revenue and strengthened institutional quality is likely 
to decrease corruption. The prediction of a negative (substitutive) relation between corruption 
and the shadow economy is in line with the models of Choi and Thum (2004) and Dreher, 
Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2005a).
28) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26) This section is taken from Dreher and Schneider (2006), pages 4, 5 and 14 as well as table 4.1. 
27) See Dreher and Siemers (2005) for a formalization of this argument. 
28) Consequently, Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2005a) test their model employing data for OECD 
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In low income countries, to the contrary, we expect different mechanisms to prevail. Instead 
of working partly in the official sector and offering additional services underground as in 
high-income countries, enterprises completely engage in underground activity. Examples for 
enterprises operating completely underground are restaurants, bars, or haircutters – and even 
bigger production companies. As one reason for this, the public goods provided by the official 
sector are in many developing countries less efficient as compared to high income countries. 
Big companies, however, are comparably easy to detect and – in order to escape taxation and 
punishment – they have to bribe officials, thereby increasing corruption. Corruption often 
takes place in order to pay for activities in the shadow economy, so that the shadow economy 
entrepreneur can be sure not to be detected by public authorities. Here, shadow economy and 
corruption are likely to reinforce each other, as corruption is needed to expand shadow 
economy activities and – at the same time – underground activities require bribes and 
corruption. To get some additional income from the shadow economy entrepreneur, it is 
natural for public officials to ask for bribes and thus benefit from the shadow market. In low 
income countries, we therefore expect a positive (complementary) relation between corruption 
and the shadow economy. This corresponds to the predictions of the models of Hindriks et al. 
(1999) and Johnson et al. (1997).  
In summary, following Dreher and Schneider (2006), I expect: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In low income countries, shadow economy activities and corruption are 
complements.  
 
Hypothesis 2: In high income countries, shadow economy activities and corruption are 
substitutes. 
 
These two hypotheses are tested for a cross-section of 120 countries and a panel of 70 
countries for the period 1994 to 2002.
29) Table 4.1 summarizes the empirical results of Dreher 
and Schneider (2006): Overall, they show that an increase in perceived corruption over time 
also increases the shadow economy. This confirms the models of Johnson et al. (1998) and 
Hindriks et al. (1999). Across countries, however, greater perceived corruption does not lead 
to a greater shadow economy. To some extent this also supports the results of Méon and 
Sekkat (2004) showing the within-country variation to be important in their analysis of 
corruption on foreign direct investment and exports. 
                                                           
29) For the description of the data, the estimation techniques used, and the various specification see Dreher and 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  32 
 
Regarding the impact of the shadow economy on perceived corruption, these results for the 
overall sample are similar to those for the other way round. In the cross-country regressions, 
all coefficients are completely insignificant. An increase in the shadow economy over time 
increases corruption according to the fixed and random effects estimator, but not when the 
endogeneity of the shadow is controlled for. Turning to the sub-samples, the results show that 
higher perceived corruption significantly reduces the shadow economy in high income 
countries, confirming the models of Choi and Thum (2004) and Dreher, Kotsogiannis and 
McCorriston (2005a). In low income countries, to the contrary, corruption tends to increase 
with a higher shadow economy, again confirming the models of Johnson et al. (1998) and 
Hindriks et al. (1999). This is true for the impact of perceived corruption in the within-groups 
specification and actual corruption in all specifications. 
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Table 4.1: Empirical Results of the Relationship between the Shadow Economy and 
Corruption 
 
Dependent Variable:  Shadow Economy  Corruption 
Independent Variable:  Corruption  Shadow Economy 
Estimation technique  All  Low  High  All  Low  High 
ICRG index of corruption 












Robust regression  1.32 
(0.82) 
-  -  0.00  
(0.43) 
-  - 




































Panel, random effects  1.59 
(4.81***)
-  -  0.02 
(2.64***)
-  - 
Panel IV  3.46 
(3.48***)
-  -  0.01 (0.12) -  - 
TI index of corruption 
OLS  -  -  -  -  -  -0.06  
(2.35**) 
World Bank Index of corruption 
OLS  -  -  -  -  -  -0.01  
(2.76**) 
DKM index of corruption 






Robust regression  -  -  -  0.04 
(1.69*) 
- - 














Higher values represent more corruption; corruption indices used: ICRG International Country Risk 
Guide; TI=Transparency International; World Bank Index of Corruption; and DKM-Index of Dreher, 
Kotsogiannis and McCorriston.  
Instruments for the shadow economy are: (1) Credit Market Regulations (Fraser), Minimum Wage 
Regulation (Fraser), Government Effectiveness (World Bank); (2) Starting a Business (Duration), Starting 
a Business (Costs), Flexibility to Hire, Flexibility to Fire. 
Instruments for corruption are: (1) Fiscal Burden (Heritage), Regulation of Prices (Fraser), Rule of Law 
(World Bank), Democracy; (2) Ethnic Fractionalization, Religious Fractionalization, Latitude, French 
Legacy, Socialist Legacy, German Legacy, Scandinavian Legacy. 
 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level  
 
Source: Dreher and Schneider (2006, table 12). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  34 
 
5 Summary  and  Conclusions 
 
There have been many obstacles to overcome to measure the size of the shadow economy, to 
analyze its consequences on the official economy and the interaction between corruption and 
the shadow economy, but as this paper shows some progress has been made. I provided 
estimates of the size of the shadow economies for 145 countries for three periods of time 
(1999/2000, 2001/2002 and 2002/2003) using the DYMIMIC and the currency demand 
approach. Coming back to the question in the headline of this paper, some (new) 
knowledge/insights are gained with respect to the size and development of the shadow 
economy of developing, transition, highly developed OECD, Pacific Islands and Communist 
countries,
30) and to the relationship between the shadow economy and corruption leading to 
five conclusions: 
The first conclusion from these results is that for all countries investigated the shadow 
economy has reached a remarkably large size; the summarized results are shown in table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Average Size of the Shadow Economy for Developing, Transition and OECD-




Average Size of the Shadow Economy – Value added in % of 
official GDP using DYMIMIC and Currency Demand 
method (Number of Countries) 













































Unweighted Average over 145 
Countries 
33.6  34.5 35.2 
Source: Own calculations. 
                                                           
30) In the appendix some critical discussion of these two methods is given, they have well known weaknesses, 
compare also Pedersen (2003). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  35 
 
The second conclusion is, shadow economies are a complex phenomenon, present to an 
important extent in all type of economies (developing, transition and highly developed). 
People engage in shadow economic activity for a variety of reasons, among most important, 
of which we can count are government actions, most notable taxation and regulation. With 
these two insights/conclusions goes a third, no less important one: a government aiming to 
decrease shadow economic activity has to first and foremost analyze the complex 
relationships between the official and shadow economy – and even more important – among 
consequences of its own policy decisions. 
 
Considering a public choice perspective a fourth conclusion for highly developed countries 
is, that a government may not have a great interest to reduce the shadow economy due to the 
facts, that 
(i) tax losses my be moderate, as at least 2/3 of the the income earned in the shadow economy 
is immediately spend in the official economy, 
(ii) income earned in the shadow economy increases the standard of living at least of 1/3 of 
the working population, and 
(iii) people who work in the shadow economy have less time for other things like to go on 
demonstrations, etc. 
Considering these three facts, it is obvious, that one of the big challenges for every 
government is to undertake efficient incentive orientated policy measures in order to make 
work less attractive in the shadow economy and hence to make the work in the official 
economy more attractive. In a number of OECD countries this policy direction has been 
successfully implemented and this has lead to a reduction of the shadow economy. 
 
A final and fifth conclusion is, that the results of the empirical analysis of Dreher and 
Schneider (2006) suggest that corruption and the shadow economy tend to be substitutes in 
high income countries, but complements in low income countries. There is thus some support 
for their hypotheses (1 and 2). The analysis also shows, however, that the results do to some 
extent depend on the method of estimation. 
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6  Appendix 1: Methods to Estimate the Size of the Shadow 
Economy 
 
As has already been mentioned in chapters 2 and 3 estimating the size and development of a 
shadow economy is a difficult and challenging task. In this appendix I give a short but 
comprehensive overview on the various procedures to estimate the size of a shadow economy. 
Three different types of methods are most widely used, and each is briefly discussed as well 
as critically evaluated. 
 
6.1 Direct  Approaches 
 
6.1.1  Survey Method 
These are micro approaches that employ either well designed surveys and samples based on 
voluntary replies or tax auditing and other compliance methods. Sample surveys designed to 
estimate the shadow economy are widely used in a number of countries
31). The main 
disadvantage of this method is that it presents the flaws of all surveys. For example, the 
average precision and results depend greatly on the respondent’s willingness to cooperate, it is 
difficult to asses the amount of undeclared work from a direct questionnaire, most 
interviewers hesitate to confess a fraudulent behavior, and responses are of uncertain 
reliability, which makes it difficult to calculate a real estimate (in monetary terms) of the 
extend of undeclared work. The main advantage of this method lies in the detailed 
information about the structure of the shadow economy, but the results from these kinds of 
surveys are very sensitive to the way the questionnaire is formulated
32). 
In order to demonstrate the difficulties to calculate a macro estimation for a whole country 
from survey results of shadow economy activities (from single individuals) the following 
example is used. In Austria the author undertook a representative questioning of the Austrian 
population in order to estimate the size of the shadow economy in the construction an 
                                                           
31)The direct method of voluntary sample surveys has been extensively used for Norway by Isachsen, Klovland 
and Strom (1982), and Isachsen and Strom (1985). For Denmark this method is used by Mogensen et. al. (1995) 
in which they report „estimates“ of the shadow economy of 2.7 percent of GDP for 1989, of 4.2 percent of GDP 
for 1991, of 3.0 percent of GDP for 1993 and of 3.1 percent of GDP for 1994. In Pedersen (2003) estimates of 
the Danish shadow economy contain the years 1995 with 3.1% up to 2001 with 3.8%. 
32)The advantages and disadvantages of this method are extensively dealt by Pedersen (2003), Mogensen et. al 
(1995) and Feld and Larsen (2005) in their excellent and very carefully done investigations. Compare also the 
careful and detailed studies by Kazemier (2005a,b), who extensitively discusses the pros .and cons of this 
method. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  37 
craftsman sector (including repairing) in November /December 2002 considering three 
groups.  
1.  A representative sample of the Austrian population between 16 and 65 years old. 
2.  55 self declared shadow economy workers in the construction and craftsmen 
sector, and 
3.  320 managers (owners) of construction and craftsmen firms. 
The following results were gained: (1) Among the Austrian population (potential labour 
force) are 918.000 Austrians who supplied shadow economy activities in the construction and 
craftsmen sector. They average hourly earning in the shadow economy varies between €15,30 
and €15,60, and the average yearly income from shadow economy activities varies between € 
1.117,- and €1.142,-. This means that 73 hours per year were worked in the shadow economy. 
(2) Among the 55 self-declared shadow economy workers I got a wage rate of € 11,50 per 
hour and an earning per year in the shadow economy was € 2.480,- using the fact, that these 
group worked 245 hours per year in the shadow economy.  
(3) Managers (owners) of construction and craftsmanship firms report a wage rate of shadow 
economy workers of € 17,- per hour and an average earning per year from € 4.590,-, assuming 
that 270 hours per year were used for shadow economy activities by their employees/workers. 
The questioned managers also state: 21% that more then 50% of their employees work in the 
shadow economy, 41% that less then 50%, and 34% that no-one in the firm works in the 
shadow economy. To summarize 62 % of the managers acknowledge that a large percentage 
of their employees work in the shadow economy. Further results are, that 7% of the managers 
think, that their employees work between 0 and 2 hours per week in the shadow economy; 29 
% assume that they work between 6 and 10 hours, 28% between 3 and 5 hours and 14% think 
that their employees work more then 10 hours per week in the shadow economy; 22% of all 
managers have no knowledge of this fact. In principle 39% of managers are not in favour (do 
not support), that their workers moonlight and 61 % are in favour (do support) - an amazing 
high percentage. 
Finally in the table 6.1 the aggregate values of the size of the shadow economy in the 
construction and craftsmen sector of the year 2002 based on questionnaire findings are 
presented. Table 6.1 clearly demonstrates, that the size of the shadow economy in the 
construction an craftsmen sector varies considerably from a total value of 2.6 billion Euros up 
to 4.2 billion Euros. These differences origin from different hourly wages rates, ranging from 
11,50 € to 17 € and from the different amount of hours worked per year in the shadow 
economy ranging from 245 h to 270 h. Hence the survey method “covers” between 31,2% and 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  38 
50,9 % of the value obtained by a macro approach (mimic method). These results leave still 
open a considerable leeway, but the rather large differences may be explained due to the 
following facts: 
1. Table 6.1 contains earnings and not the value added of the shadow economy.  
2. Shadow economy demanders are overwhelmingly households, the whole area of the 
shadow economy activities between firms (which are especially a problem in the construction 
and craftsmen sectors) are not considered. 
3. All foreign shadow economy activities achieved by foreigners (illegal immigrants) is not 
considered. 
4. The amount earned in the shadow economy, hourly wage rate and hours worked per year 
vary considerably. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  39 
 
Table 6.1: Size of the supplied shadow economy in the construction and craftsmen 
sector, Austria 2002, based on the questionnaire findings  
Worked hours and earning in the shadow economy   
 














results from managers 
of construction and 
craftsmen firms 
(4) 
∅  hourly shadow 
economy wage rate 
  
11.5 €  17 €  11.5 €  17 € 
∅ average yearly 
earning 
2,814 €  4,165 €  3,105 €  4,590 € 
∅  amount of hours 
worked in the shadow 
economy per year per 
worker 
245 h  245 h  270 h  270 h 
∅  aggregated yearly 
amount of million 
hours worked in the 
shadow economy 1) 
225.1 Mio. h  225.1 Mio. h  248.1 Mio. h  248.1 Mio. h 
Total earnings of the 
shadow economy in 
the year 2002 
2,588.65 Mio. €  3,826.7 Mio. €  2,853.15 Mio. €  4,217.7 Mio. € 
Total shadow 
economy earnings in 
% of the value added 
of the shadow 




absolute value 8,284 
billion € in 2002 
31,2% 46,1% 34,4%  50,9% 
1) Basis of the calculation 918,864 shadow economy workers in the construction and 
craftsmen sector. Source: Own calculations. 
 
6.1.2  Tax Auditing Method  
Estimates of the shadow economy can also be based on the discrepancy between income 
declared for tax purposes and that measured by selective checks. Fiscal auditing programs 
have been particularly effective in this regard. Since these programs are designed to measure 
the amount of undeclared taxable income, they may also be used to calculate the shadow 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  40 
economy.
33) However, a number of difficulties beset this approach. First, using tax 
compliance data are equivalent to using a (possibly biased) sample of the population. In 
general, the selection of tax payers for tax audit is not random but based on properties of 
submitted (tax) returns that indicate a certain likelihood of (tax) fraud. Consequently, such a 
sample is not a random one of the whole population, and estimates of the shadow based upon 
a biased sample may not be accurate. Second estimates based on tax audits reflect only that 
portion of shadow economy income that the authorities succeed in discovering, and this is 
likely to be only a fraction of hidden income. 
 
A further disadvantage of these two direct methods (surveys and tax auditing) is that they lead 
only to point estimates. Moreover, it is unlikely that they capture all „shadow“ activities, so 
they can be seen as providing lower bound estimates. They are unable to provide estimates of 
the development and growth of the shadow economy over a longer period of time. As already 
argued, they have, however at least one considerable advantage – they can provide detailed 
information about shadow economy activities and the structure and composition of those who 
work in the shadow economy. 
 
6.2 Indirect  Approaches 
 
These approaches, which are also called „indicator“ approaches, are mostly macroeconomic 
ones and use various economic and other indicators that contain information about the 
development of the shadow economy (over time). Currently there are five indicators that 
leave some „traces“ of the shadow economy.  
 
6.2.1  The Discrepancy between National Expenditure and Income Statistics 
This approach is based on discrepancies between income and expenditure statistics. In 
national accounting the income measure of GNP should be equal to the expenditure measure 
of GNP. Thus, if an independent estimate of the expenditure site of the national accounts is 
available, the gap between the expenditure measure and the income measure can be used as an 
indicator of the extent of the black economy.
34) Since national accounts statisticians are 
                                                           
33)In the United States, IRS (1979, 1983), Simon and Witte (1982), Witte (1987), Clotefelter (1983), and Feige 
(1986). For a more detailed discussion, see Dallago (1990) and Thomas (1992). 
34) See, e.g., Franz (1983) for Austria; MacAfee (1980) O’Higgins (1989) and Smith (1985), for Great Britain; 
Petersen (1982) and Del Boca (1981) for Germany; Park (1979) for the United States. For a critical survey, see 
Thomas (1992). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  41 
anxious to minimize this discrepancy, the initial discrepancy or first estimate, rather than the 
published discrepancy should be employed as an estimate of the shadow economy. If all the 
components of the expenditure site are measured without error, then this approach would 
indeed yield a good estimate of the scale of the shadow economy. Unfortunately, however, 
this is not the case. Instead, the discrepancy reflects all omissions and errors everywhere in 
the national accounts statistics as well as the shadow economy activity. These estimates may 
therefore be very crude and of questionable reliability.
35)  
 
6.2.2  The Discrepancy between the Official and Actual Labor Force  
A decline in participation of the labor force in the official economy can be seen as an 
indication of increased activity in the shadow economy. If total labor force participation is 
assumed to be constant, than a decreasing official rate of participation can be seen as an 
indicator of an increase in the activities in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.
36) One 
weakness of this method is that differences in the rate of participation may also have other 
causes. Also, people can work in the shadow economy and have a job in the „official’ 
economy. Therefore such estimates may be viewed as weak indicators of the size and 
development of the shadow economy. 
 
6.2.3  The Transactions Approach 
This approach has been most fully developed by Feige.
37) It is based upon the assumption, 
that there is a constant relation over time between the volume of transaction and official GNP, 
as summarized by the well-known Fisherian quantity equation, or M*V = p*T (with M = 
money, V = velocity, p = prices, and T = total transactions). Assumptions also have to be 
made about the velocity of money and about the relationships between the value of total 
transactions (p*T) and total (=official + unofficial) nominal GNP. Relating total nominal 
GNP to total transactions, the GNP of the shadow economy can be calculated by subtracting 
the official GNP from total nominal GNP. However, to derive figures for the shadow 
economy, one must also assume a base year in which there is no shadow economy and 
                                                           
35) A related approach is pursued by Pissarides and Weber (1988), who use micro data from household budget 
surveys to estimate the extend of income understatement by self-employed. 
36) Such studies have been made for Italy, see e.g., Contini (1981) and Del Boca (1981); for the United States, 
see O’Neill (1983), for a critical survey, see again Thomas (1992). 
37) For an extended description of this approach, see Feige (1996); for a further application for the Netherlands, 
Boeschoten and Fase (1984), and for Germany, Langfeldt (1984). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  42 
therefore the ratio of p*T to total nominal (official = total) GNP was „normal“ and would 
have been constant over time, if there had been no shadow economy.  
 
This method, too, has several weaknesses, such as the required assumptions of a base year 
with no shadow economy, and of a „normal“ ratio of transactions to nominal GNP. Moreover, 
to obtain reliable shadow economy estimates, precise figures of the total volume of 
transactions should be available, and this availability might be especially difficult to achieve 
for cash transactions, because they depend, among other factors, on the durability of bank 
notes in terms of the quality of the papers on which they are printed.
38) Also, the assumption 
is made that all variations in the ratio between the total value of transaction and the officially 
measured GNP are due to the shadow economy. This means that a considerable amount of 
data is required in order to eliminate financial transactions from “pure” cross payments, which 
are legal and have nothing to do with the shadow economy. In general, although this approach 
is theoretically attractive, the empirical requirements necessary to obtain reliable estimates are 
so difficult to fulfill, that its application may lead to doubtful results. 
 
6.2.4  The Currency Demand Approach 
The currency demand approach was first used by Cagan (1958), who calculated a correlation 
of the currency demand and the tax pressure (as one cause of the shadow economy) for the 
United States over the period 1919 to 1955. 20 years later, Gutmann (1977) used the same 
approach but without any statistical procedures. Cagan’s approach was further developed by 
Tanzi (1980, 1983), who econometrically estimated a currency demand function for the 
United States for the period 1929 to 1980 in order to calculate the shadow economy. His 
approach assumes that shadow (or hidden) transactions are undertaken in the form of cash 
payments, so as to leave no observable traces for the authorities. An increase in the size of the 
shadow economy will therefore increase the demand for currency. To isolate the resulting 
„excess“ demand for currency, an equation for currency demand is econometrically estimated 
over time. All conventional possible factors, such as the development of income, payment 
habits, interest rates, and so on, are controlled for. Additionally, such variables as the direct 
and indirect tax burden, government regulation and the complexity of the tax system, which 
are assumed to be the major factors causing people to work in the shadow economy, are 
                                                           
38)For a detailed criticism of the transaction approach see Boeschoten and Fase (1984), Frey and Pommerehne 
(1984), Kirchgaessner (1984), Tanzi (1982a,b, 1986), Dallago (1990), Thomas (1986, 1992, 1999), Giles 
(1999a), Pederson (2003), and Janisch and Brümmerhoff (2005) and Breusch (2005a, 2005b). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  43 
included in the estimation equation. The basic regression equation for the currency demand, 
proposed by Tanzi (1983), is the following:  
 
ln (C / M2)t = βO + β1 ln (1 + TW)t + β2 ln (WS / Y)t + β3 ln Rt + β4 ln (Y / N)t + ut 




ln denotes natural logarithms,  
C / M2 is the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts,  
TW is a weighted average tax rate (to proxy changes in the size of the shadow economy),  
WS / Y is a proportion of wages and salaries in national income (to capture changing payment 
and money holding patterns),  
R is the interest paid on savings deposits (to capture the opportunity cost of holding cash) and  
Y / N is the per capita income.
39)  
 
Any „excess“ increase in currency, or the amount unexplained by the conventional or normal 
factors (mentioned above) is then attributed to the rising tax burden and the other reasons 
leading people to work in the shadow economy. Figures for the size and development of the 
shadow economy can be calculated in a first step by comparing the difference between the 
development of currency when the direct and indirect tax burden (and government 
regulations) are held at its lowest value, and the development of currency with the current 
(much higher) burden of taxation and government regulations. Assuming in a second step the 
same income velocity for currency used in the shadow economy as for legal M1 in the official 
economy, the size of the shadow can be computed and compared to the official GDP. 
 
The currency demand approach is one of the most commonly used approaches. It has been 
applied to many OECD countries,
40) but has nevertheless been criticized on various 
grounds.
41) The most commonly raised objections to this method are several:  
 
                                                           
39) The estimation of such a currency demand equation has been criticized by Thomas (1999) but part of this 
criticism has been considered by the work of Giles (1999a,b) and Bhattacharyya (1999), who both use the latest 
econometric technics. 
40)See Karmann (1986 and 1990), Schneider (1997, 1998a), Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a), 
and Williams and Windebank (1995).  
41)See Thomas (1992, 1999), Feige (1986), Pozo (1996), Pedersen (2003) and Ahumada, Alvareda, Canavese A. 
and P. Canavese (2004). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  44 
(i)  Not all transactions in the shadow economy are paid in cash. Isachsen and Strom 
(1985) used the survey method to find out that in Norway, in 1980, roughly 80 percent 
of all transactions in the hidden sector were paid in cash. The size of the total shadow 
economy (including barter) may thus be even larger than previously estimated. 
(ii)  Most studies consider only one particular factor, the tax burden, as a cause of the 
shadow economy. But others (such as the impact of regulation, taxpayers’ attitudes 
toward the state, „tax morality“ and so on) are not considered, because reliable data 
for most countries is not available. If, as seems likely, these other factors also have an 
impact on the extent of the hidden economy, it might again be higher than reported in 
most studies.
42) 
(iii)  As discussed by Garcia (1978), Park (1979), and Feige (1996), increases in currency 
demand deposits are due largely to a slowdown in demand deposits rather than to an 
increase in currency caused by activities in the shadow economy, at least in the case of 
the United States.  
(iv)  Blades (1982) and Feige (1986, 1996), criticize Tanzi’s studies on the grounds that the 
US dollar is used as an international currency. Instead, Tanzi should have considered 
(and controlled for) the presence of US dollars, which are used as an international 
currency and held in cash abroad.
43) Moreover, Frey and Pommerehne (1984) and 
Thomas (1986, 1992, 1999) claim that Tanzi’s parameter estimates are not very 
stable.
44) 
(v)  Most studies assume the same velocity of money in both types of economies. As 
argued by Hill and Kabir (1996) for Canada and by Klovland (1984) for the 
Scandinavian countries, there is already considerable uncertainty about the velocity of 
                                                           
42)One (weak) justification for the only use of the tax variable is that this variable has by far the strongest impact 
on the size of the shadow economy in the studies known to the authors. The only exception is the study by Frey 
and Weck-Hannemann (1984) where the variable „tax immorality“ has a quantitatively larger and statistically 
stronger influence than the direct tax share in the model approach. In the study of Pommerehne and Schneider 
(1985), for the U.S., besides various tax measures, data for regulation, tax immorality, minimum wage rates are 
available, the tax variable has a dominating influence and contributes roughly 60-70 percent to the size of the 
shadow economy. See also Zilberfarb (1986). 
43) In another study by Tanzi (1982, esp. pp. 110-113) he explicitly deals with this criticism. A very careful 
investigation of the amount of US-$ used abroad and the US currency used in the shadow economy and to 
"classical" crime activities has been undertaken by Rogoff (1998), who concludes that large denomination bills 
are major driving force for the growth of the shadow economy and classical crime activities due largely to 
reduced transactions costs. 
44) However in studies for European countries Kirchgaessner (1983, 1984) and Schneider (1986) reach the 
conclusion that the estimation results for Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are quite robust when using 
the currency demand method. Hill and Kabir (1996) find for Canada that the rise of the shadow economy varies 
with respect to the tax variable used; they conclude „when the theoretically best tax rates are selected and a range 
of plausible velocity values is used, this method estimates underground economic growth between 1964 and 
1995 at between 3 and 11 percent of GDP.“ (Hill and Kabir [1996, p. 1553]).  26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  45 
money in the official economy, and the velocity of money in the hidden sector is even 
more difficult to estimate. Without knowledge about the velocity of currency in the 
shadow economy, one has to accept the assumption of an „equal“ money velocity in 
both sectors. 
(vi)  Ahumada, Alvaredo, Canavese A. and P. Canavese (2004) show, that the currency 
approach together with the assumption of equal income velocity of money in both, the 
reported and the hidden transaction is only correct, if the income elasticity is 1. As this 
is for most countries not the case, the calculation has to be corrected. 
(vii)  Finally, the assumption of no shadow economy in a base year is open to criticism. 




6.2.5  The Physical Input (Electricity Consumption) Method 
(1) The Kaufmann – Kaliberda Method
45) 
To measure overall (official and unofficial) economic activity in an economy, Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996) assume that electric-power consumption is regarded as the single best 
physical indicator of overall (or official plus unofficial) economic activity. Now, overall 
economic activity and electricity consumption have been empirically observed throughout the 
world to move in lockstep with an electricity to GDP elasticity usually close to one. This 
means, that the growth of total electricity consumption is an indicator for growth of overall 
(official and unofficial) GDP. By having this proxy measurement for the overall economy and 
then subtracting from this overall measure the estimates of official GDP, Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996) derive an estimate of unofficial GDP. This method is very simple and 
appealing. However, it can also be criticized on various grounds: 
 
(i)  Not all shadow economy activities require a considerable amount of electricity (e.g. 
personal services), and other energy sources can be used (gas, oil, coal, etc.). Only a 
part of the shadow economy will be captured. 
(ii)  Over time, there has been considerable technical progress, so that both the production 
and use of electricity are more efficient than in the past, and this will apply in both 
official and unofficial uses. 
                                                           
45)This method was used earlier by Lizzeri (1979), Del Boca and Forte (1982), and then was used much later by 
Portes (1996), Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997). For a critique see 
Lackó (1998). 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  46 
(iii)  There may be considerable differences or changes in the elasticity of electricity/GDP 




 (2) The Lackó Method 
Lackó (1996, 1998, 1999, 2000) assumes that a certain part of the shadow economy is 
associated with the household consumption of electricity. This part comprises the so-called 
household production, do-it-yourself activities, and other non registered production and 
services. Lackó further assumes that in countries where the portion of the shadow economy 
associated with the household electricity consumption is high, the rest of the hidden economy 
(or the part Lackó cannot measure) will also be high. Lackó (1996, pp.19 ff.) assumes that in 
each country a part of the household consumption of electricity is used in the shadow 
economy.  
 
Lackó’s approach (1998, p.133) can be described by the following two equations: 
ln Ei =  α1 ln Ci + α2 ln PRi + α3 Gi + α4 Qi + α5 Hi + ui (1) 
with     α1 > 0, α2 < 0, α3 > 0, α4 < 0, α5 > 0 
Hi =  β1 Ti + β2 (Si – Ti) + β3 Di     (2) 
with β1 > 0, β2 < 0, β3 > 0 
where 
i: the number assigned to the country, 
Ei: per capita household electricity consumption in country i in Mtoe, 
Ci: per capita real consumption of households without the consumption of electricity in 
country i in US dollars (at purchasing power parity), 
PRi: the real price of consumption of 1 kWh of residential electricity in US dollars (at 
purchasing power parity), 
Gi: the relative frequency of months with the need of heating in houses in country i, 
Qi: the ratio of energy sources other than electricity energy to all energy sources in household 
energy consumption, 
Hi: the per capita output of the hidden economy, 
Ti: the ratio of the sum of paid personal income, corporate profit and taxes on goods and 
services to GDP, 
Si: the ratio of public social welfare expenditures to GDP, and 
                                                           
46)Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) make an attempt to adjust for changes in the elasticity of 
electricity/GDP. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  47 
Di: the sum on number of dependants over 14 years and of inactive earners, both per 100 
active earners. 
 
In a cross country study, she econometrically estimates equation (1) substituting Hi by 
equation (2). The econometric estimation results can then be used to establish an ordering of 
the countries with respect to electricity use in their respective shadow economies. For the 
calculation of the actual size (value added) of the shadow economy, Lackó further must know 
how much GDP is produced by one unit of electricity in the shadow economy of each 
country. Since these data are not known, she takes the result of one of the known shadow 
economy estimations, that were carried out for a market economy with another approach for 
the early 1990s, and she applies this proportion to the other countries. Lackó used the shadow 
economy of the United States as such a base (the shadow economy value of 10.5% of GDP 
taken from Morris(1993)), and then she calculates the size of the shadow economy for other 
countries. Lackó’s method is also open to criticism: 
(i)  Not all shadow economy activities require a considerable amount of electricity and 
other energy sources can be used. 
(ii)  Shadow economy activities do not take place only in the household sector. 
(iii)  It is doubtful whether the ratio of social welfare expenditures can be used as the 
explanatory factor for the shadow economy, especially in transition and developing 
countries. 
(iv)  It is questionable which is the most reliable base value of the shadow economy in 
order to calculate the size of the shadow economy for all other countries, especially, 
for the transition and developing countries.   
 
6.3 The  Model  Approach
47 
 
All methods described so far that are designed to estimate the size and development of the 
shadow economy consider just one indicator that “must” capture all effects of the shadow 
economy. However, it is obvious that shadow economy effects show up simultaneously in the 
production, labor, and money markets. An even more important critique is that the causes that 
                                                           
47)This summary is derived from a longer study by Aigner, Schneider, and Ghosh (1988, p. 303), applying this 
approach for the United States over time; for Germany this approach has been applied by Karmann (1986 and 
1990). The pioneers of this approach are Weck (1983), Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984), who applied this 
approach to cross-section data from the 24 OECD countries for various years. Before turning to this approach 
they developed the concept of „soft modeling“ (Frey, Weck, and Pommerehne (1982), Frey and Weck (1983a 
and 1983b)), an approach which has been used to provide a ranking of the relative size of the shadow economy 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  48 
determine the size of the shadow economy are taken into account only in some of the 
monetary approach studies that usually consider one cause, the burden of taxation. The model 
approach explicitly considers multiple causes leading to the existence and growth of the 
shadow economy, as well as the multiple effects of the shadow economy over time.  
 
The empirical method used is quite different from those used so far. It is based on the 
statistical theory of unobserved variables, which considers multiple causes and multiple 
indicators of the phenomenon to be measured. For the estimation, a factor-analytic approach 
is used to measure the hidden economy as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown 
coefficients are estimated in a set of structural equations within which the “unobserved” 
variable cannot be measured directly. The DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-
causes) model consists in general of two parts, with the measurement model linking the 
unobserved variables to observed indicators.
48) The structural equations model specifies 
causal relationships among the unobserved variables. In this case, there is one unobserved 
variable, or the size of the shadow economy; this is assumed to be influenced by a set of 
indicators for the shadow economy’s size, thus capturing the structural dependence of the 
shadow economy on variables that may be useful in predicting its movement and size in the 
future. The interaction over time between the causes Zit (i = 1, 2, …, k) the size of the shadow 
economy Xt, in time t and the indicators Yjt (j = 1, 2, …, p) is shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
 











                                                                                                                                                                                     
in different countries. 
48) The latest papers dealing extensively with the DYMIMIC or MIMIC approach, its development and its 
weaknesses is from Del’Anno (2003) and the excellent study by Giles and Tedds (2002), as well as Breusch 
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There is a large body of literature
49) on the possible causes and indicators of the shadow 
economy, in which the following three types of causes are distinguished: 
 
Causes 
(i)  The burden of direct and indirect taxation, both actual and perceived. A rising burden 
of taxation provides a strong incentive to work in the shadow economy. 
(ii)  The burden of regulation as proxy for all other state activities. It is assumed that 
increases in the burden of regulation give a strong incentive to enter the shadow 
economy. 
(iii)  The „tax morality“ (citizens’ attitudes toward the state), which describes the readiness 
of individuals (at least partly) to leave their official occupations and enter the shadow 




A change in the size of the shadow economy may be reflected in the following indicators: 
(i)  Development of monetary indicators. If activities in the shadow economy rise, 
additional monetary transactions are required. 
(ii)  Development of the labor market. Increasing participation of workers in the hidden 
sector results in a decrease in participation in the official economy. Similarly, 
increased activities in the hidden sector may be expected to be reflected in shorter 
working hours in the official economy. 
(iii)  Development of the production market. An increase in the shadow economy means 
that inputs (especially labor) move out of the official economy (at least partly), and 
this displacement might have a depressing effect on the official growth rate of the 
economy. 
 
The latest use of the model approach has been undertaken by Giles (1999a, 1999b, 1999c) and 
by Giles, Tedds and Werkneh (2002), Giles and Tedds (2002), Chatterjee, Chaudhury and 
Schneider (2006) and Bajada and Schneider (2005). They basically estimate a comprehensive 
                                                           
49)Thomas (1992); Schneider (1994a, 1997, 2003, 2005); Pozo (1996); Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón 
(1998a, 1998b); Giles (1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c); Giles and Tedds (2002), Giles, Tedds and Werkneh 
(2002), Del’Anno (2003) and Del’Anno and Schneider (2004). 
50) When applying this approach for European countries, Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) had the difficulty in 
obtaining reliable data for the cause series, besides the ones of direct and indirect tax burden. Hence, their study 
was criticized by Helberger and Knepel (1988), who argue that the results were unstable with respect to 
changing variables in the model and over the years. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  50 
(sometime dynamic) MIMIC model to get a time series index of the hidden/measured output 
of New Zealand, Canada, India or Australia, and then estimate a separate “cash-demand 
model” to obtain a benchmark for converting this index into percentage units. Unlike earlier 
empirical studies of the hidden economy, they paid proper attention to the non-stationary, and 
possible co-integration of time serious data in both models. Again this DYMIMIC model 
treats hidden output as a latent variable, and uses several (measurable) causal variables and 
indicator variables. The former include measures of the average and marginal tax rates, 
inflation, real income and the degree of regulation in the economy. The latter include changes 
in the (male) labor force participation rate and in the cash/money supply ratio. In their cash-
demand equation they allow for different velocities of currency circulation in the hidden and 
recorded economies. Their cash-demand equation is not used as an input to determine the 
variation in the hidden economy over time – it is used only to obtain the long-run average 
value of hidden/measured output, so that the index for this ratio predicted by the DYMIMIC 
model can be used to calculate a level and the percentage units of the shadow economy. 
Overall, this latest combination of the currency demand and DYMIMIC approach clearly 
shows that some progress in the estimation technique of the shadow economy has been 
achieved and a number of critical points have been overcome. 
 
However, also against the (DY)MIMIC method objections can be raised, too, which are  
(1) instability in the estimated coefficients with respect to sample size changes, 
(2) instability in the estimated coefficients with respect to alternative specifications, 
(3) difficulty to obtain reliable data on cause variables other than tax variables, and 
(4) the reliability of the variables grouping into “causes” and “indicators” in explaining the 
variability of the shadow economy. 
6.4  Summarizing the Critical Remarks 
 
In the table 5.4 some more general weaknesses/criticisms of the different methods to estimate 
the shadow economy are summarized. Tabel 5.5 clearly shows, that each methods has it’s 
strength and weaknesses and that we are far away from having an ideal or most preferred 
estimation method. When undertaking the difficult and challenging task to estimate the 
shadow economy, all methods have weaknesses and it is important to report and to consider 
them and to treat the size and development of shadow economy with great care. 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  51 
 
Some critical Points of the Different Estimation Methods  
1. Surveys 
(1) Quite often only households or only partly firms are considered 
(2) Non-responses and/or incorrect responses 
2.Estimations of national account statisticians (quite often the discrepancy method): 
(1) Combination of meso estimates/assumptions 
(2) Often not published 
(3) Documentation and procedures often not public 
3. Monetary and/or electricity methods: 
(1) Some estimates are very high 
(2) Are the assumptions plausible? 
(3) Breakdown by sector or industry possible? 
4. DYMIMIC method  
(1) only relative coefficients, no absolute values 
(2) estimations quite often highly sensitive with respect to changes in the data. 
 
6.5  The Size and Development of the Shadow Economies of 145 Countries 
over 1999/2000 to 2002/2003  
 
Finally, the results of the size and development of the shadow economies of 145 countries are 
shown (and the countries are listed in alphabetical order) in table 5.5. 
Table 6.5: The Size of the Shadow Economy of 145 Countries 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using 
the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02 2002/03 
1 Albania  33,4 34,6 35,3 
2 Algeria  34,1 35,0 35,6 
3 Angola  43,2 44,1 45,2 
4 Argentina  25,4 27,1 28,9 
5 Armenia  46,3 47,8 49,1 
6 Australia  14,3 14,1 13,5 
7 Austria  9,8 10,6 10,9 
8 Azerbaijan  60,6 61,1 61,3 
9 Bangladesh  35,6 36,5 37,7 
10 Belarus  48,1 49,3 50,4 
11 Belgium  22,2 22,0 21,0 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  52 
Table 6.5: The Size of the Shadow Economy of 145 Countries (cont.) 
 
  
Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using 
the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02 2002/03 
 
12 Benin  47,3 48,2 49,1 
13 Bhutan  29,4 30,5 31,7 
14 Bolivia  67,1 68,1 68,3 
15  Bosnia and Herzegovina  34,1 35,4 36,7 
16 Botswana  33,4 33,9 34,6 
17 Brazil  39,8 40,9 42,3 
18 Bulgaria  36,9 37,1 38,3 
19 Burkina  Faso  41,4 42,6 43,3 
20 Burundi  36,9 37,6 38,7 
21 Cambodia  50,1 51,3 52,4 
22 Cameroon  32,8 33,7 34,9 
23 Canada  16,0 15,8 15,2 
24  Central African Republic  44,3 45,4 46,1 
25 Chad  46,2 47,1 48,0 
26 Chile  19,8 20,3 20,9 
27 China  13,1 14,4 15,6 
28 Colombia  39,1 41,3 43,4 
29  Congo, Dem. Rep.  48,0 48,8 49,7 
30 Congo,  Rep.  48,2 49,1 50,1 
31 Costa  Rica  26,2 27,0 27,8 
32 Cote  d'Ivoire  43,2 44,3 45,2 
33 Croatia  33,4 34,2 35,4 
34 Czech  Republic  19,1 19,6 20,1 
35 Denmark  18,0 17,9 17,3 
36 Dominican  Republic  32,1 33,4 34,1 
37 Ecuador  34,4 35,1 36,7 
38  Egypt, Arab Rep.  35,1 36,0 36,9 
39 El  Salvador  46,3 47,1 48,3 
40 Estonia  38,4 39,2 40,1 
41 Ethiopia  40,3 41,4 42,1 
42 Fiji  33,6 34,3 35,1 
43 Finland  18,1 18,0 17,4 
44 France  15,2 15,0 14,5 
45 Georgia  67,3 67,6 68,0 
46 Germany  16,0 16,3 16,8 
47 Ghana  41,9 42,7 43,6 
48 Greece  28,7 28,5 28,2 
49 Guatemala  51,5 51,9 52,4 
50 Guinea  39,6 40,8 41,3 
51 Haiti  55,4 57,1 58,6 
52 Honduras  49,6 50,8 51,6 
53  Hong Kong, China  16,6 17,1 17,2 
54 Hungary  25,1 25,7 26,2 
55 India  23,1 24,2 25,6 
56 Indonesia  19,4 21,8 22,9 
57  Iran, Islamic Rep.  18,9 19,4 19,9 
58 Ireland  15,9 15,7 15,3 
59 Israel  21,9 22,8 23,9 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  53 




Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using 
the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02 2002/03 
60 Italy  27,1 27,0 25,7 
61 Jamaica  36,4 37,8 38,9 
62 Japan  11,2 11,1 10,8 
63 Jordan  19,4 20,5 21,6 
64 Kazakhstan  43,2 44,1 45,2 
65 Kenya  34,3 35,1 36,0 
66 Kiribati  34,1 35,0 35,3 
67 Korea,  Rep.  27,5 28,1 28,8 
68 Kuwait  20,1 20,7 21,6 
69 Kyrgyz  Republic  39,8 40,3 41,2 
70 Lao  PDR  30,6 31,9 33,4 
71 Latvia  39,9 40,7 41,3 
72 Lebanon  34,1 35,6 36,2 
73 Lesotho  31,3 32,4 33,3 
74 Lithuania  30,3 31,4 32,6 
75 Macedonia,  FYR  34,1 35,1 36,3 
76 Madagascar  39,6 40,4 41,6 
77 Malawi  40,3 41,2 42,1 
78 Malaysia  31,1 31,6 32,2 
79 Maldives  30,3 31,4 32,0 
80 Mali  42,3 43,9 44,7 
81 Marshall  Islands  28,1 29,0 29,6 
82 Mauritania  36,1 37,2 38,0 
83 Mexico  30,1 31,8 33,2 
84  Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  31,3 32,1 33,2 
85 Moldova  45,1 47,3 49,4 
86 Mongolia  18,4 19,6 20,4 
87 Morocco  36,4 37,1 37,9 
88 Mozambique  40,3 41,3 42,4 
89 Namibia  31,4 32,6 33,4 
90 Nepal  38,4 39,7 40,8 
91 Netherlands  13,1 13,0 12,6 
92 New  Zealand  12,8 12,6 12,3 
93 Nicaragua  45,2 46,9 48,2 
94 Niger  41,9 42,6 43,8 
95 Nigeria  57,9 58,6 59,4 
96 Norway  19,1 19,0 18,4 
97 Oman  18,9 19,4 19,8 
98 Pakistan  36,8 37,9 38,7 
99 Palau  28,4 29,2 30,0 
100 Panama  64,1 65,1 65,3 
101 Papua  New  Guinea  36,1 37,3 38,6 
102 Paraguay  27,4 29,2 31,4 
103 Peru  59,9 60,3 60,9 
104 Philippines  43,4 44,5 45,6 
105 Poland  27,6 28,2 28,9 
106 Portugal  22,7 22,5 21,9 
107 Puerto  Rico  28,4 29,4 30,7 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  54 




Shadow Economy (in % of off. GDP) using 
the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method 
No.  Country  1999/00 2001/02 2002/03 
 
108 Romania  34,4 36,1 37,4 
109 Russian  Federation  46,1 47,5 48,7 
110 Rwanda  40,3 41,4 42,2 
111 Samoa  31,4 32,6 33,5 
112 Saudi  Arabia  18,4 19,1 19,7 
113 Senegal  45,1 46,8 47,5 
114  Serbia and Montenegro  36,4 37,3 39,1 
115 Sierra  Leone  41,7 42,8 43,9 
116 Singapore  13,1 13,4 13,7 
117 Slovak  Republic  18,9 19,3 20,2 
118 Slovenia  27,1 28,3 29,4 
119 Solomon  Islands  33,4 34,5 35,3 
120 South  Africa  28,4 29,1 29,5 
121 Spain  22,7 22,5 22,0 
122 Sri  Lanka  44,6 45,9 47,2 
123 Sweden  19,2 19,1 18,3 
124 Switzerland  8,6 9,4 9,4 
125 Syrian  Arab  Republic  19,3 20,4 21,6 
126 Taiwan,  China  25,4 26,6 27,7 
127 Tanzania  58,3 59,4 60,2 
128 Thailand  52,6 53,4 54,1 
129 Togo  35,1 39,2 40,4 
130 Tonga  35,1 36,3 37,4 
131 Tunisia  38,4 39,1 39,9 
132 Turkey  32,1 33,2 34,3 
133 Uganda  43,1 44,6 45,4 
134 Ukraine  52,2 53,6 54,7 
135 United  Arab  Emirates  26,4 27,1 27,8 
136 United  Kingdom  12,7 12,5 12,2 
137 United  States  8,7 8,7 8,4 
138 Uruguay  51,1 51,4 51,9 
139 Uzbekistan  34,1 35,7 37,2 
140 Vanuatu  30,9 31,7 32,5 
141 Venezuela,  RB  33,6 35,1 36,7 
142 Vietnam  15,6 16,9 17,9 
143 Yemen,  Rep.  27,4 28,4 29,1 
144 Zambia  48,9 49,7 50,8 
145 Zimbabwe  59,4 61 63,2 
Unweighted Average  33,6 34,5 35,2 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  55 
 
7  Appendix 2: Definition of the variables and data sources  
 
7.1  Some general remarks 
 
(1) All calculations and estimations are based on the software package “Intercooled Stata 8.0” 
(2) All growth rates or shares as described in the following section. For example a growth rate 
of 2 % is defined as 0.02 instead of 2.0. 
(3) In for some reasons observations for important countries for 1 year are missing we used 
the following formula to calculate the average growth rate for these variables: 
 
(variable t+n / variable t) 
1/n 
 
Multiplying the value of the variable from year t with the average growth rate gives the value 
for t+1. Formally: 
(Average growth rate) x (variable t) = variable t+1 
 
7.2  Definition of the data and sources 
 
(1) GDP per capita on PPP basis  
GDP per capita is based on purchasing power parity [PPP]. PPP GDP is gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An 
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the 
United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current dollars. 
Source: World Bank, International Comparison Programme database. 
 
(2) Annual GDP per capita Growth Rate  
Out of this GDP per capita values for the observed 145 countries the independent variable 












Source: World Bank, International Comparison Programme database; own calculation by 
authors. 
 
(3) Shadow Economy  
The variable Shadow Economy is defined as the informal sector [shadow economy] in percent 
of official GDP. The estimations for the size of the shadow economy are undertaken using the 
DYMIMIC and the currency demand approaches; using the values calculated in section 3. 
This variable is available for three points in time namely the years 1999/00, 2001/02 and 
2002/03. 
Source: Own calculation by the author. 
 
(4) Dummy Industrialized Countries  
The variable Dummy Industrialized Countries is a binary variable and takes the value 0 if a 
country is a developing country and 1 if the country is an industrialized country. “Developing 
Country” corresponds to high income classification of World Bank Indicators 2002 with per 
capita income of USD 9,265 or less. The same applies to “Industrialized Countries” which are 
defined as countries with per capita GDP of USD 9,266 or more.  
Source: Own calculation by authors. 
 
(5) Dummy Transition countries  
The variable Dummy Transition Countries is a binary variable and takes the value 1 if a 
country is a transition country from a centrally planned economy to a market economy and 0 
if the country is not. This variable is used for the classification of the countries. 
Source: Own Calculation by authors. 
 
(6) Dummy OECD countries  
The variable Dummy OECD countries is a binary variable and takes the value 1 if a country is 
member of the OECD and 0 if the country is not. 
Source: Own Calculation by authors. 
 
(7) Share of Direct Taxation (in % of GDP) 
Source: OECD, Paris 2003, Taxing Wages and World Bank (Washington D.C.), 2003, 
Governance Indicators.  26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  57 
 
(8) Share of Indirect Taxation and Custom Duties in % of GDP 
Source: See Share of Direct Taxation. 
 
(9) Burden of State Regulation 
Burden of State regulation, index of regulation, where a score is of 1 signifies and economic 
environment most conductive to economic freedom, where a less score of 5 signifies least 
economic freedom. Source: Heritage Foundation 2005, Index of Economic Freedom, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
(10) Employment Quota (in % of population between 18 and 64)  
Source: OECD, Paris, various years, Employment Outlook. 
 
(11) Unemployment Quota (% of unemployed in the working force) 
Source: OECD various years, Employment Outlook. 
 
(12) Change of Currency per Capita, Annual Rate of Currency per Capita 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data and OECD National Accounts Data Files, 
Washington and Paris, various years. 
 
(13) Tax Morale (Index) 
Source: European Values Study, EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY, 1999/2000 [Computer file] 
2003/Release 1, The Netherlands, Germany: Tilburg University, Zentralarchiv für Empirische 
Sozialforschung, Cologne (ZA), Netherlands Institute for Scientific Information Services 
(NIWI), Amsterdam [producer], 2003. Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische 
Sozialforschung, Cologne [distributor], 2003. Inglehart, Ronald et.al. World Values Surveys 
and European Values Surveys, 1981-1984, 1990-1993 and 1995-1997 [Computer file]. ICPSR 
version. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research [producer], 2000. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2000. 
 
(14) Quality of Institutions 
index =0 lowest quality, =100 highest quality, Source World Bank, years 1999 to 2003 
 26.09.06, C:\ShadEconomyCorruption_2006_Pickhardt.doc  58 
(15) Social Security Burden 
Definition: social security payments (employers and employees) in % of GDP, Source OECD, 
2003, 2004 
 
Quality of state institutions, World Bank rule of law index, ranges from -3 to +3, with higher 
scores showing better environments, i.e. the higher the score the better is the rule of law in 
that respective country. Source: Kaufmann, D.; Kraay, A. and M. Mastruzzi, 2003, 
Governments Matters III: Governments Indicators for 1996/2002, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Papers 3106, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
 
 
8  Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics of the variables  
 
Variable Mean  Minimum Maximum  Standard 
Deviation 
Shadow Economy  31.78  6.90  68.20  12.72 
Income tax rate (Fraser)  4.95  0.00  10.00  3.01 
Custom duties (% of GDP)  6.44  0.00  10.00  2.34 
Direct Taxes (% of GDP)  20.20  0.37  47.28  9.69 
Indirect Taxes (% of GDP)  24.63  0.04  58.76  10.48 
Regulation (Heritage)  3.37  1.00  5.00  0.93 
Rule of law (World Bank)  0.00  -2.04  2.36  0.98 
Government effectiveness (World Bank)  -0.02  -2.28  2.59  0.95 
Social security burden (% of GDP)  18.3  0.00  26.3  6.42 
Tax morale  4.51  1.78  8.46  2.32 
Unemployment quota  9.46  3.41  24.36  3.43 
GDP per capita in USD  14532.01 543.74  37541.23  10552.23 
Annual rate of GDP (%)  6.62  -5.58  12.64  2.34 
Change of local currency per capita  7.47  0.21  14.64  3.24 
Employment quota  40.23  34.12  66.41  16.43 
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